What Can We Do?  Puzzling over the Interpretation of Heredity and Variation from Galton to Genetic Engineering by Taylor, Peter J.
University of Massachusetts Boston
ScholarWorks at UMass Boston
Working Papers on Science in a Changing World Critical and Creative Thinking Program
Spring 5-1-2019
What Can We Do? Puzzling over the Interpretation




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umb.edu/cct_sicw
Part of the Agriculture Commons, Genetics Commons, Science and Technology Studies
Commons, and the Statistics and Probability Commons
This Occasional Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Critical and Creative Thinking Program at ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Working Papers on Science in a Changing World by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston.
For more information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu.
Recommended Citation
Incomplete manuscript. Not to be cited without author's written permission.
	 	
What can we do? 
Puzzling over the interpretation of heredity and variation 
from Galton to genetic engineering 
	
PETER J. TAYLOR 
	
Paper # 19 -2019 
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/cct_sicw/19	
 ii 
What Can We Do?  
Puzzling over the Interpretation of Heredity and Variation from Galton to Genetic 
Engineering 
 
Peter J. Taylor 
Science in a Changing World graduate track 
University of Massachusetts Boston 
 
Table of Contents 
Prologue ...........................................................................................................................................1 
Terms ...............................................................................................................................................3 
1. Why was Galton so Concerned about “Regression to the Mean”? ......................................9 
Bridge 1: From Environmental Complexity to Social Epidemiology ...............................31 
2. Genes, Gestation, and Life Experiences: Critical Thinking about Studies of the 
Complexities of Environment and Development in the Age of DNA ...............................31 
Bridge 2: From Plant Breeding to Human Variation and Heredity ...................................53 
3. Three Puzzles and Eight Gaps: What Heritability Studies and Critical Commentaries have 
not Paid Enough Attention to .............................................................................................55 
4. The Analysis of Variance is an Analysis of Causes (of a Very Circumscribed Kind) ......80 
5. Gene-free Formulation of Classical Quantitative Genetics ...............................................97 
6. Interpretation of Classical Quantitative Genetics under Alternatives to Three Standard 
Assumptions .....................................................................................................................109 
Bridge 3: qq ........................................................................................................................qq 
7. Reworking the Frameworks of Proponents and Critics of Heritability Studies Who Either 
Combine Measurable Factors with Data on Variation among Varieties and Locations, 
Blur the Trait-Underlying Factor Distinction, or Do Both ................................................qq 
8. The Persistence of the Nature Versus Nurture Formulation Viewed in Relation to the 
Conflation of Family and Population  ................................................................................qq 
9. What to Do if We Think that Researchers have Overlooked a Significant Conceptual 
Issue? ................................................................................................................................. Qq  
10. NN vs NN. 
 iii 
11. Five Gapsqq .......................................................................................................................qq 
12. ............................................................................................................................................qq 
13. Qqmove up the  
Bridge qq 
14. Infrastructure and Scaffolding: Interpretation and Change of Research Involving Human 
Genetic Information, I ........................................................................................................qq 
15. Infrastructure and Scaffolding: Interpretation and Change of Research Involving Human 




1. Numerical illustrations of the gene-free formulation of Chapter 5 and of the contrasting 
results under the standard and alternative assumptions of Chapter 6 ................................qq 
2. Ratios of DZ similarity to MZ similarity under the model in which a trait occurs when the 
dosage from many loci exceeds a threshold (Chapter 6) ...................................................qq 
3. Contrasting formulations in a selection of articles that point to the potential importance of 
interaction variance ............................................................................................................qq 







“Each realization opens up questions. Why?”   
(= my six-word memoir, http://bit.ly/Y02nja), 4 April 2013 
 
Soon after an earlier book of mine on nature-nurture issues appeared (Taylor 2014), a 
colleague from gender studies read—or tried to read—its introduction. She asked me, somewhat 
testily, “What does this have to do with nature-nurture issues that feminists discuss? What can 
we do with your analysis?” My subsequent exploration of her “nature versus nurture” versus the 
one central to the 2014 book (to be described in chapters qq) led me to identify not two but five 
conceptually distinct nature-nurture sciences. Making these distinctions got me puzzling further: 
When I had mentioned to colleagues that I was exploring some significant issues overlooked by 
both sides in nature-nurture debates, the typical response was “we know, of course, that nature 
and nurture are intertwined”; they never asked “which nature-nurture science are you referring 
to?” It occurred to me that, in the long history of nature-nurture debates, opposing sides had 
always assumed or implied that these different scientific approaches were speaking to the same 
issues (chapter qq). If that were the case, then the challenge—something I was already puzzling 
over—was how best to draw attention to significant overlooked issues, in this case, the 
distinctions among the nature-nurture distinctions.  
In this vein, puzzling-begets-puzzling has been a repeated experience for me. I have 
found myself chewing over a range of positions or practices concerning heredity, variation, and 
their interpretation that did not seem to fit together. Especially interpretation that implies 
constraints on what we can do, on how much we can change. Puzzling over pieces of science, in 
turn, has opened up—or, at other times, derived from—puzzling about interpretation of what 
scientists do and about how to influence them. I hope that the conceptual themes I arrive at have 
a coherence that is appreciated by various readers of this book. Moreover, I hope that the 
questions raised but left unresolved seem salient and, together with themes of mine that engage 
you, stimulate fresh directions of puzzling for yourselves. 
Or not. Although conceptual exploration is where I am able to make my most whole-
hearted contributions, I am well aware of the limitations of new concepts in shifting the thinking 
and practice of others. Instead, diverse resources and practical considerations, given by your 
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particular situations and life histories, condition whether themes such as the ones in this book 
come to make a difference for your knowledge making and action. I certainly understand if, for 
you, having to respond to challenges and crises in this world and engaging in concrete projects of 
caring, collaboration, confrontation, and change, takes precedence over following my conceptual 
explorations. My appreciation of the complexities of trying to change thinking and practice also 
means that, although in places I identify shortcomings in the work of other authors, I do not 
spend much expository muscle in conversation with them. I find it more rewarding to motivate, 
in a somewhat pedagogical style, themes that can help avoid problems and confusions in the 
studies and interpretation of heredity and variation. And themes that help bring into focus 
interesting scientific and policy questions, reframe them, and take them in new directions. 
The chapters follow a somewhat chronological order of when I started to focus on the 
given puzzle. Feel free, however, to choose a different order, perhaps jumping ahead into the 
puzzles that seem to connect most with your concerns. Whether you take the linear path or move 
forward and back, the italicized preambles and personal narrative inserted between some 
chapters should serve as a helpful guide. Postscripts are added to point to relevant developments 
since the time captured in the chapters.  
Caveat lector, I continue. 
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Terms 
Items in italics are described elsewhere in the glossary. The index can be consulted for 
the first mention of the term in the body of the text. 
 
g empirically determined parameter in the gene-free formulation of quantitative genetics 
that takes degree of relatedness into account. 
 
S The sum over possible values of the subscript in the expression that follows. 
 
Additive model: a) Equation that connects the values of the trait for an individual to the 
summation of several contributions (sense b); b) A parallel equation that adds up variances 
related to these contributions. 
 
ANOVA or Analysis of Variance: The variance of a trait is divided into parts or 
components corresponding to each term (contribution [sense b]) in an additive model. For 
example, for observations of a set of varieties raised in a set of locations, one part would be the 
variance of the variety means. The other parts would be the location means, the variety-location-
interaction means (after subtracting the first two means), and noise, residual or “error” 
contributions (see equation 1 in Item D). 
 
Average: see Mean 
 
Behavioral genetics: Quantitative genetics applied to behavioral traits, most commonly 
human behavioral traits. 
 
Cause: A difference that makes a difference. The former difference refers to either a) an 
intentional modification (e.g., adding fertilizer to an agricultural plot); or b) a distinction between 
points of data with regard to a measured factor that is not, by and large, modifiable (e.g., male 
versus female sex).  
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Component: (as used in this book) The parts into which the ANOVA divides the variance 
of a trait. 
 
Contribution (as used in this book): a) as colloquially understood, i.e., something given or 
supplied in common with other contributors; b) a term in an equation that connects the values of 
the trait for an individual to the summation of several such terms (see additive model). 
Contribution sense b. substitutes for the technical term effect because that term is causally 
ambiguous. 
 
Dizygotic (DZ) twins: Two offspring gestated together from two separately fertilized 
eggs. Contrast Monozygotic twins. 
 
Effect: See contribution, sense b. 
 
Environment: a) Set of specific environmental factors; or b) Synonym for location, a term 
that can be used without reference to or knowledge of the environmental factors present. 
 
Epigenetics (as the term is used in recent molecular biology): Chemicals from outside the 
cell can modify the activity of genes for the rest of the organism’s life and sometimes even into 
subsequent generations.  
 
Experimental data: Data derived from explicit manipulation of measured factors or 
conditions. 
 
Factor (as used in this book): Something for which its presence or absence can be 
observed or its level can be measured—a quality that is emphasized in some places in the text by 
adding the adjective “measurable.” For any given trait, the factors of interest are those associated 
with changes or variation in the trait's development, but the causal quality of a factor is a 
secondary matter. Measurable genetic factors include the presence or absence of variants 
(alleles) at a specific place (locus) on a chromosome, repeated DNA sequences, reversed sections 
of chromosomes, and so on. Measurable environmental factors can range widely, for example, 
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from fertilizer application per hectare of crop to average daily intake of calories to degree of 
maltreatment that a person experienced as a child. 
 
Genetic (as used in this book): An adjective used in reference to factors that are 
transmitted through the germline from parents to offspring and whose presence or absence can, 
in principle, be observed. 
 
Genotype: a) The pair of variants (alleles) for a given place or locus on two paired 
chromosomes; b) A synonym for variety, a term that can be used without reference to or 
knowledge of the genetic factors present. 
 
Genotypic values: See variety means. 
 
Heritability: a) The ratio of the variance of the variety means for a given trait to the 
overall variance of that trait in a population consisting of a specific set of varieties raised in some 
specific location(s); b) (recent definition, referred to in this book as new heritability): The 
fraction of variance in a trait associated with variation in Single-Nucleotide Polymorphisms 
(SNPs) as examined by Genome-Wide Association studies. 
 
Heritability studies: (as used in this book) Research that uses methods of quantitative 
genetics for partitioning variation in a trait into heritability and other components, such as, the 
variance of the location means. 
 
Heterogeneity: A state in which one kind of thing can be separated into a spectrum, range 
or mixture of many different kinds. See also underlying heterogeneity. 
 
Heterozygous: The two variants that make up a genotype (sense a) are different. 
 
Homozygous: The two variants that make up a genotype (sense a) are the same. 
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Interaction: a) A variety-by-location interaction is a contribution (sense b) and variety-
by-location interaction variance is one part in an Analysis of Variance. When this variance is 
high for the trait in question, the ranking of varieties varies across locations and the best variety 
in one location is not the best in other locations; b) A gene-environment interaction derives from 
a regression analysis involving measured genetic factors and measured environmental factors in 
which included in the additive model are additional terms that are the product of a genetic factor 
and an environmental factor. More generally, interaction means that the quantitative relation 
between the trait and one of the factors varies according to the measured value of the other 
factor. 
 
Intraclass Correlation: Ratio of variances of the contributions that do not vary within the 
class (and are thus included in the class averages) to the overall variance. For classes of size two 
this quantity is mathematically equivalent to the usual linear correlation of the two values in each 
class or pair, when the order in each pair is arbitrary. Arbitrary ordering would apply if one 
wanted to know the correlation, for example, of heights in same-sex couples. 
 
Location: The situation or place in which a variety is raised, such as a family (for 




Measurable factor: See factor. 
 
Monozygotic (MZ) twins: Two offspring gestated together after a single fertilized egg 
splits and forms two embryos.  
 
Observational data: Data derived on individuals that can be subdivided into relevant 
categories (e.g., raised in low socioeconomic status) but have not been assigned randomly to be 
subject to specific conditions (e.g., 50 kg/ha of nitrogen fertilizer) (see experimental data).  
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Path Analysis: Data analysis technique that defines a network of interrelated variables, 
which may be measurable factors or contributions estimated in an Analysis of Variance, and 
estimates the relative contribution of each variable to the variation in a focal variable after 
allowing for the intervening variables. The estimates of relative contributions are called path 
coefficients. Their reliability depends on the assumptions built into the networks, such as, in 
heritability studies, the similarity of relatives of different degrees and the inclusion in the 
additive model (or exclusion) of coefficients for variety-location interaction. 
 
Quantitative genetics: A field in which variation in traits of humans, other animals, or 
plants is analyzed in ways that take account of the genealogical relatedness of the individuals 
whose traits are observed.  (See also behavioral genetics and heritability studies.) 
 
Regression analysis: For an equation (often in the form of an additive model) that 
combines a set of measured factors (the “independent” variables), the coefficients to each 
variable are estimated that make the equation predict the trait (the “dependent” variable) better 
than other values of the coefficients. “Predict best” can be assessed by the lowest residual 
variance (the “least squares”) or other criteria. 
 
Replicates: Two or more individuals raised in the same variety-location combination (for 
heritability studies) or with the same values of the measured factors for regression analysis. 
 
Rerun Predictability: The closeness of a match in the following situation: For a set of 
variety-location combinations trait values are a result of unknown dynamics that include some 
unsystematic noise. The same variety-location combinations are observed again where the only 
change in this “rerun” is noise at the same level as the original, but uncorrelated with it. All 
possible pairs of values are considered in which the first value is from the original situation and 
the second is from the rerun, where for each pair the original and rerun variety is the same 
(alternatively, the location is the same). The closeness of match is assessed by the correlation of 
the original and rerun values, making use of an additive model of contributions and assuming 
that the actual noise is given by the residual or noise contribution.  
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Social Epidemiology: qq 
 
Structural Equation Modeling: A generalization of path analysis to include unmeasured 
“latent” variables that add together several measured factors (see additive model) in a way that 
fits the actual data well, not in a predetermined equation. 
 
Trait: Observed characteristic of an individual.  (See Item B.1 for explanation of why the 
term commonly used in heritability studies, phenotype, is not used in this book.) 
 
Underlying Heterogeneity: When similar responses of different varieties or individual 
types are observed, but it is not the case that similar conjunctions of genetic and environmental 
factors (or, in epidemiology, risk and protective factors) have been involved in producing those 
responses (i.e., values for the trait in question).  
 
Variance: The common measure of variation. The variance for the population considers 
the size of the deviation of an individual’s trait from the mean value for the population, squares 
that, then finds the average over all the individuals. The variety variance considers the size of the 
deviations of the variety means from the overall mean, and so on. 
 
Variety: A group of individuals whose relatedness by genealogy can be characterized, 
such as offspring of a given pair of parents, or a group of individuals whose mix of genetic 
factors can be replicated, as in an open pollinated plant variety or pure (genetically identical) 
lines. The term can be used without knowledge of the underlying genetic factors.  
 
Variety mean: The mean or average of the values observed for the trait across all 




Why was Galton so Concerned about Regression to the Mean? 
 
In 1990 I was to take over teaching a college-level course about biology in its social context. 
One topic was the concern that Francis Galton, a younger relative of Darwin, had about 
regression to the mean. I saw that historians of science who placed Galton in his social and 
intellectual context either focused on his general interest in a science of human heredity or 
accounted for his specific concerns about regression in ways that left interesting questions 
unanswered. I set out to find my own path to expose the significance of regression to my 
students. The result of my puzzling included interpreting Galton’s explicit concerns about 
biological inheritance in terms of his implicit views of the appropriate role of his social stratum. 
This interpretation points to social and scientific issues that still require examination and 
clarification.  
 
In the spirit of pedagogical or expository self-consciousness, let me identify at the outset 
three opening-up themes that underlie the chapter. The significance of these themes will emerge 
during the chapter and the book as a whole. Extensions of these themes are spelled out at the end 
of each section.  
Theme 1.1: Opening-up themes. Interpreters of science can indirectly approach the 
complexity of particular cases by motivating simple themes that open up questions and 
point to further work needed to grapple with the complexities of other, particular cases.  
Theme 1.2: Asking what we can do. It can be illuminating to ask what the authors 
(including ourselves) state or imply about what we can do. (This deliberately broad 
formulation encompasses views about the social actions and organization they support as 
well as their views about the capabilities of different people growing up in our society 
and how difficult these are to change.)  
Theme 1.3: Reciprocal animation. Close examination of concepts and methods within 
any given natural or social science can stimulate our inquiries into the diverse social 
influences shaping that science, and reciprocally. 
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I. Patterns among relatives: A classroom activity 
Before I discuss Galton and regression, let me introduce a classroom activity that 
establishes a pedagogical tone for the chapter and an emphasis on fundamental concepts. I want 
to ask you, the readers, to be scientists and try to make sense of data that link parents and 
offspring. Consider one plot (of your own choosing) from figures 1-4 depicting heights of 63 
undergraduate college students and their parents. (I collected these data in the USA in the mid to 
late 1990s.) What patterns can you discern? What ideas or questions do you have about the 
causes producing those patterns? What questions or reservations do you have about the process 
you go through in answering these questions? 
 
Figure 1.1. Son's vs. father's height (inches) 
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Figure 1.2. Daughter's vs. mother's height (inches) 
  
Figure 1.3. Student's vs. average of parents' height (inches) 
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Figure 1.4. Father's vs. mother's height (inches) 
 
OK readers. Keep your answers in mind as I describe what usually emerges when I ask 
these questions in my classes on biology and society. Students identify patterns in many ways. 
They draw boxes, ellipses, or convoluted shapes around the data points, mark highs and low 
values for each of the variables, note how many offspring are taller than their parents, separate 
the main cloud of points from outliers, draw trend lines through the cloud, and so on. Many 
students note that in the first three plots an increase in one variable tends to be associated with an 
increase in the other (albeit with considerable spread around any trend line). No trend, however, 
is seen in figure 1.4, which depicts the heights of each pair of parents. Indeed, often students will 
say there is no pattern in that plot. Some students notice the outlier half way up on the right in 
which the mother, at 72”, is 3” taller than the father. They do not notice the pattern that the father 
is taller than the mother in almost every pair, but see it once I point it out. 
When it comes to explanation, the first three plots are typically seen as indications of the 
hereditary relation between parents and offspring. Because there is no hereditary relation 
between any mother and father, students conclude at first that no causality can be drawn from 
figure 1.4. However, once I have drawn attention to the strong father-taller-than-mother pattern, 
lively discussion about the causes ensues for this plot too: Does this pattern correspond to men 
choosing female partners shorter than them or to women choosing male partners taller than 
them? Or both? 
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A range of questions or reservations are expressed about the process of this scientific 
inquiry, including the reliability of the data (how accurate are the data, which presumably came 
from students’ recall or phone calls to their parents); criteria for inclusion (could adoptive or 
step-parents have been included); whether the students have stopped growing (perhaps heights 
should have been collected for parents when at the same age as their child is now); and whether 
outliers warrant special explanation (or can they be viewed as points at the end of a spectrum).  
As the teacher I inject further issues into the discussion: What additional knowledge leads 
the students to invoke heredity? (Couldn’t height trends result from parents feeding their children 
the way they were fed?) Why plot same sex pairs and exclude the opposite sex parent? (Is this a 
choice dictated only by the difficulties of plotting in three dimensions?) Why plot offspring 
height against the average of the parents? (Does this presume that height is a blending of 
contributions—hereditary or otherwise—from parents?) Most importantly, what could anyone do 
(or be constrained from doing) on the basis of the patterns or explanations?  
On this last issue of "what can we do?", I note that the mother-father height pattern, 
originally overlooked by students, is of great significance to taller heterosexual women because 
it corresponds to a smaller selection of men available to them as potential partners. If the height 
norm were contested, these women would have new options opened up. It would also reduce the 
frequency of couples in which the man is very much taller and consequently stronger than the 
woman. In contrast, the hereditary explanation of the trend in the first three plots does not 
suggest any action other than inaction—parents cannot do anything to change the outcomes for 
their offspring once these offspring have been conceived.  
The inaction conclusion about height might not trouble us, at least not enough to make us 
delve into possible relationships between growth trajectories and, say, maternal nutrition before 
and during pregnancy, childhood diet, exercise, and so on. However, I ask my students, if the 
data were of IQ test scores, not heights, would inaction be an acceptable conclusion? Or would 
they pursue the process of identifying patterns, proposing explanations, exploring reservations 
(including raising alternatives) differently? 
This simple classroom activity allows us to unpack the simple picture of science as 
empirical observation and rational interpretation (i.e., identifying patterns and trying to explain 
them). These are only two of the many steps in scientific inquiry (figure 1.5). At each step 
decisions are made that depend on knowledge—perhaps assumed knowledge—in addition to 
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what can be drawn from any data collected. Scientific inquiry cannot proceed without decisions 
that take into account diverse additional considerations, such as, in this classroom activity: 
technical constraints of plotting in three dimensions; theories about the mechanisms of heredity, 
temporal ordering (parents grow before their offspring are born and grow), whether to collect 
data about the diet of parents and offspring when they were growing up, and conventions about 
designation of outlier status to extreme points. Each step becomes a site where decisions made 
can be shaped by convention, ongoing negotiation, and wider influences. These sites of sociality 
invite critical scrutiny (Taylor 2005). We can, for example, consider the ways that 
preconceptions or preferences about the outcomes at the later steps feed forward to earlier ones 
(as depicted by the dashed lines in figure 1.5) so that the inquiry tends to reinforce that outcome. 
As will be shown in the discussion of Galton’s work, such feed forward loops can involve the 
social actions or organization supported or desired by scientists—what they think we as a society 
can or should do. 
 
All possible phenomena that could be inquired into 
(-> subset of phenomena generated by experimental manipulation) 
-> phenomenon deemed interesting for study  
 -> questions asked about the phenomenon 
  -> categories demarcated in the questions 
   -> observations made within those categories  
    -> data collected from the observations 
     -> patterns perceived in data 
      -> predictions made based on the patterns  
      or hypotheses about causes 
-> actions supported by predictions 
or causes 
  
Figure 1.5. A chain of steps in scientific inquiry in which each step (indicated by an arrow ->) 
involves assumptions and is open for negotiation and wider influences. The dashed lines depict 
the possibility that desired outcomes for the later stages influence decisions made at earlier steps. 
See text for discussion. 
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----------- 
Through this classroom activity extensions of themes 1.2 and 1.3 have emerged: 
Theme 1.4: Sites of sociality. There are many sites in scientific inquiry at which decisions 
are made based on knowledge drawn from outside the observations to be explained. 
Theme 1.5: The negotiation, assumptions about social possibilities and constraints, and 
wider influences that shape decisions made at these open sites invite critical scrutiny. 
 
II. Why was Galton so concerned about “regression to the mean”? 
Students in introductory statistics courses learn that correlation is a measure of the 
tightness of association between measurements of different attributes or variables for each 
individual in some set. For example, for each student in the previous section I had recorded the 
height of the student, the student’s father, and the student’s mother. If for each male student, the 
height were tightly associated with the height of their father, a plot of the two measurements 
would fall close to a straight line. Because the correlation is looser the plot is a cloud of points 
with some tendency upwards from left to right (Figure 1.1). 
Statistics students also learn about regression lines, which can be drawn through the 
cloud to give the best prediction of one measurement (e.g., daughter’s height) on the basis of the 
other measurement (e.g., mother’s height). “Best” here means that the discrepancies between the 
actual and predicted values are minimized (strictly, the average of the discrepancies squared are 
minimized). This can be seen by eye by marking the average daughters' height in each vertical 
slice in figure 1.6. The regression line does not run right through the averages but finds an 
overall balance of averages above the line with those below. (Present-day forms of regression 
analysis can be more complicated, involving curves through the data and minimizing 
discrepancies in other ways, but the simple, linear regression was the original sense and the basis 
of Galton's concerns. It is the sense used throughout this chapter.)  
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Figure 1.6. Daughter's vs. mother’s height (inches). Solid line denotes equal values. Dashed line 
is the regression line. The mean is the point where the two lines cross. The ellipse approximates 
the cloud of points (as discussed later in the text). 
----------- 
Correlation and (linear) regression lines capture the same quality of the measurements, 
namely, the tightness of clumping around a line. Indeed, if the plot is scaled so that the spread of 
each variable is the same (strictly, if the standard deviations are equal), then the slope of the 
regression line is exactly the same value as the correlation (Weldon 2000). To understand the 
significance of this overlap and the strange name “regression,” we need to look at its origins in 
the nineteenth-century work of Galton. 
Francis Galton, a younger cousin of Charles Darwin, introduced both concepts —
regression first in the late 1870s and then correlation in the late 1880s—as he investigated 
similarities among relatives, especially parent and offspring pairs, for an enormous variety of 
measurements, primarily of humans—from height to mental traits, such as perception of numbers 
as colors. Through this work Galton became a leading figure in the rise during the nineteenth 
century of quantitative science of society that sought regularities or laws in the statistics 
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collected by the growing bureaucracies of the nation state—as well as by assiduous individual 
data collectors like Galton himself (Porter 1986).  
Galton's investigations led him to note that “the progeny of all exceptional individuals 
tends to ‘revert’ to mediocrity” (Galton 1877, 283). (Subsequently Galton would replace 
“reversion” with the term “regression.”) He concluded that “the ordinary genealogical course of 
a race [today we would say  population] consists in a constant outgrowth from its center, a 
constant dying away at its margins, and a tendency of the scanty remnants of all exceptional 
stock to revert to that mediocrity, whence the majority of their ancestors originally sprang” 
(1877, 298; hereon in the chapter, citations without an author’s name are to Galton’s 
publications). 
Clearly Galton was concerned about human progress—or obstacles to it. Indeed, his 
investigations originated in his desire to extend to humans the investigation of selective breeding 
of plants and animals, which Darwin (1859) had used to motivate many features of his account 
of natural selection. Uncovering the laws of human heredity was essential for this project of 
science-based social improvement (MacKenzie 1981, Porter 1986). Galton’s work on 
measurement, analysis of association among relatives, and guided evolution of humans has led to 
his being seen as the founder of several fields—psychological testing, biometry (statistical 
analysis in biology), behavioral genetics, and eugenics. In the eugenic context, Galton noted that, 
because measurements of the offspring of the exceptional regress towards the center—or mean—
of the range of measurements, “it is… impossible that the natural qualities of a race may be 
permanently changed through the action of selection on mere variations” (1892a, xviii; see 
Waller 2001 for a more qualified account of Galton as the founder of eugenics). 
The statistics student of today learns to calculate correlations and derive regression lines 
for data sets that do not involve heredity or improvement over time, for example, data linking the 
number of rooms in houses and their selling price. So why was the originator of these statistical 
concepts so concerned about regression to mediocrity, or, as statisticians now phrase it, 
regression to the mean? The answer I arrive at in due course is going to refer not only to Galton’s 
explicit interest in human betterment, but also to his implicit ideas about what people can do to 
pursue their interests. In order to motivate my answer, I move through a series of other possible 
answers first and consider an allied question about Galton’s views on selection. 
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As noted above, similar measurements among relatives for a given trait say nothing on 
their own to distinguish, in Galton’s words, “between the effects of tendencies received at birth, 
and of those that were imposed by the circumstances of their after lives” (1875, 566). However, 
especially for the traits that concerned him, namely, “superior faculties” or abilities that were 
“exceptionally high” (1892a, viii), Galton was convinced at an early stage of his inquiries that 
“nature prevails enormously over nurture” (1875, 574). To Galton this was evident in the 
biographical data he had collected on illustrious men and their kinfolk (1869) and in studies of 
the life histories of similar and dissimilar twins (1875). His conclusion about nature over nurture 
may be less than convincing to us—at one point he begged the question by defining the traits he 
was measuring as those that “exclude the effects of education” (1892a, viii). What is pertinent, 
however, is that his conclusion meant he saw no need for data on what we would call 
environmental or social variables. He could investigate heredity through the patterns of similarity 
among relatives. Regression was one of those patterns. 
Now, does regression to the mean result literally in regression to the mean? Do 
measurements of individuals in each succeeding generation pack ever more tightly around the 
mean? Commonsense says no and, indeed, in places Galton acknowledged this fact. He wrote of 
a “constant outgrowth from [the] center” (1877, 298) and in Natural Inheritance (1889), which 
synthesizes his investigations of quantitative studies of heredity, he noted that “the observed 
proportions between the large and the small in each degree of size and in every quality, hardly 
varies from one generation to another” (1889, 2).  
When viewed over many generations there is no trend for measurements to regress 
literally to the mean. Logically, therefore, over a single generation there should be no regression 
towards the mean. Yet, notice that regression does seem to hold for offspring of “exceptional” 
individuals. For example, in figure 1.6, the daughters whose mother’s height is in the lowest slice 
are all between the mean and the solid line that has slope 1. In other words, the daughters are not 
so far away from the mean as their mothers. The one offspring in the highest slice is also closer 
to the mean (albeit on the other side). (Recall that “slope of 1,” “closer” and other references to 
distance assume, as is the case in Figure 1.6, that distance is scaled so that the spread 
[technically, the standard deviations] of the two variables are equal.) Is there a paradox here? 
Let us look at what holds for less-than-exceptional individuals (which was not a 
component of the population Galton dwelled on apart from his reference to a “constant 
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outgrowth from the center.”) Notice that for slices further in from the extremes in Figure 1.6, 
some daughters are closer to their mean than their mothers are, but some are further away. What 
is true is only that the average of the offspring is closer to the mean. We can also see that some 
offspring are on the other side of the mean. For the most central slices, this becomes even more 
noticeable; indeed, many of these offspring are further away from the mean but on the other side. 
In fact, if these digressions from the mean on the other side did not occur, it would be logically 
impossible for the average of offspring to be closer to the mean while preserving the same spread 
from one generation to the next.  
Once this point about digressions is appreciated, it becomes clear that for any two 
correlated variables, individuals whose measurement on the first variable is a certain distance 
from the mean for that variable will show a range of measurements on the second variable and 
that range will have an average value closer to the mean for that second variable. No hereditary 
relatedness is required for this pattern to occur. Indeed, the variables could be switched and the 
same pattern would be evident. 
We can still call the parent-offspring pattern for less-than-exceptional parents 
“regression” provided we note that it is regression of the average of the offspring towards the 
mean where many of these offspring will be further away from the mean. Galton’s choice of the 
term “regression” clearly stemmed from his focus on exceptional individuals (where few 
offspring are further from the mean), not on the population (“race”) as a whole. OK, but this 
deepens the puzzle. If the regression of the offspring of exceptional individuals towards the mean 
does not entail the population collapsing to the mean over many generations, why was Galton 
concerned about regression towards the mean? After all, without any decrease in variation from 
one generation to the next, there will be no shortage of persons who are most “efficient in 
physical, intellectual, and moral grounds” to form “our highest [social] class” (1892a, xxii). 
One possible answer, given by historians of science Bowler (1984) and Kevles (1985), 
follows from Galton’s conclusion (1892a, xviii), cited earlier, that regression ensures that 
“selection on mere variations” cannot produce any permanent improvement in a population. As 
Bowler (1984, 240) explains it: 
Imagine a sample of individuals from a particular part of the range of variation, such as a 
group of people with above average height. What will happen to the sample if we allow 
the individuals to breed only among themselves for a series of generations? Galton 
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believed that the mean value of the characteristic for the sample would regress back 
toward that of the species as a whole. After a number of generations, descendants of our 
sample of tall people would have an average height equivalent to the normal for the 
human race. 
Or, in Galton’s own words from an early point in his investigations (also cited earlier), “the 
scanty remnants of all exceptional stock… revert to that of mediocrity, whence the majority of 
their ancestors originally sprang” (1877, 298). 
There are problems, however, in accounting for Galton’s concern about regression in 
terms of the purported ineffectiveness of selection. It is not true that an above-average sample 
allowed to breed within itself must end up no longer above the average. Galton seemed to 
recognize this. Although he did not explore the theory or practice of breeding within a selected 
sample, he acknowledged the possibility that advances could be made. In his preface to the 1892 
reprint of his 1869 book, he cited the “Huguenots as men, who, on the whole, had inborn 
qualities of a distinctive kind from the majority of their countrymen, and who [are] capable, 
when isolated, of continuing their race without its showing any strong tendency to revert to the 
form of the earlier type from which it was a well-defined departure” (1892a, xxiii). 
The puzzle is now more complicated. To the question of why Galton was concerned 
about regression towards the mean, we have to add: Why was Galton confused—or, at best, 
confusing—about whether a selected sample would regress to the mean of the population (which 
is not correct) or could maintain its distinctive qualities if allowed to breed within itself? Why 
did he not follow through the logic of the latter possibility after he acknowledged it? As became 
clear to evolutionary biologists in the twentieth century, selection of a sample, then a sample of 
this sample, and so on, results in continuing change over time (as long as variation remains and 
inbreeding is small enough to keep deleterious genes masked). Let me put forward four 
interpretations of Galton’s erroneous interpretation of the ineffectiveness of “selection on mere 
variations.”  This will lead us to a place where the title question can be answered. 
The first interpretation builds on Galton’s interest in human betterment. Selection of a 
sample of the human population was, Galton remarked in the 1892 preface, primarily of 
“academic interest.”  Admittedly he showed chilling prescience of twentieth-century racial 
hygiene in the passage that followed: 
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Thought and action move swiftly nowadays, and it is by no means impossible that a 
generation which has witnessed the exclusion of the Chinese race from customary 
privileges of settlers in two continents, and the deportation of the Hebrew population 
from a large portion of a third, may live to see analogous acts performed under sudden 
socialistic pressure (1892a, xx). 
Nevertheless, the practical schemes he proposed did not rely on large scale, coercive controls 
over who reproduced. Instead, Galton’s eugenics (a term he coined) consisted of appeals and 
incentives to encourage those of high rank to have more children—at the very least, not to have 
fewer children than the population at large. If Galton were (following Theme 1.2) to ask, “What 
can we do?”, “we” would refer to his peers of high social rank; it was conceivable to him that 
they could increase their contribution to the next generation. (See Waller 2001 for discussion of 
family versus national-level concerns about heredity in nineteenth-century England.) 
The second interpretation is that Galton, for all his pioneering contributions to the 
analysis of variations, had not escaped from a typological worldview, in which variation is 
conceived in terms of deviations from a true value. Granted, when, as Stigler (1986, 265ff) 
describes, Galton sought to reconcile heredity with the ubiquitous bell-shaped distributions of 
plant and animal traits, he was contesting the implication that such variation could be understood 
in terms of Quetelet's law of errors, in which the distribution “should be wholly due to the 
collective actions of a host of independent petty influences [or errors] in various combinations” 
(Galton 1877, 289). Notwithstanding this rejection of a view of deviation as error, Galton was 
conforming with a typological worldview when, addressing the perceived ineffectiveness of 
selection upon the typical range of variations, he emphasized the role of “sports” (i.e., mutant 
individuals), in which “a new character suddenly makes its appearance in a particular individual, 
causing him to differ distinctly from his parents and from others of his race.”  (The male subject 
is hardly remarkable for a nineteenth century writer, but it reminds us that the “we” who could 
produce human betterment were men.) Galton continued: “Such new characters are also found to 
be transmitted to descendants. Here there has been a change of typical centre… a real step 
forward has been made in the course of evolution” (1892a, xviii-xix). Moreover, “sports do not 
blend freely together; variations proper do” (1892b, 20). 
The third interpretation is that evolution moving in discontinuous steps is an idea that 
persisted from the earliest days of Galton’s inquiries following his reading of Darwin (as 
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described by historian Provine 1971, 17). Like many other evolutionists until well into the 
twentieth century, Galton rejected Darwin’s account of change through “insensible gradations” 
(1869, 42). He put forward an image of a stone of many facets that might be pushed continuously 
but would return to its original state unless that pressure took it beyond a threshold and it rolled 
onto a new face (1869, 421-2). Galton continued to develop analogies from geometry and human 
inventions to illustrate discontinuous change (e.g., 1889, 28ff) and asserted that “many, if not 
most breeds, have their origins in sports” (1894, 365), which are then “favored by Natural 
Selection” (1892b, 20) over other forms, just as “one race has supplanted another [with great 
frequency] in the evolution of mankind” (1892a, xxiii). This intellectual commitment of Galton's 
leaves little room for conceptualizing evolution and human betterment that “proceed[s] by steps 
that are severally minute, and that become effective only through accumulation” (1889, 32). 
 A final interpretation builds on the previous one. It might be possible to attribute 
Galton’s emphasis on sports and his lack of interest in selection acting on the typical range of 
variation to this intellectual commitment to discontinuous change, one that pre-dated his 
investigations of similarities among relatives. It is also possible, however, to see the social action 
Galton favored (recall my Themes 1.2-1.4) in his inability to clear up his confusion about 
whether the distinctive qualities of selected samples (or sub-populations) must regress towards 
the population mean or, as Galton saw in the case of the Huguenots, need not. In Galton’s view 
of society, exceptional individuals must have a role—or, at least, some exceptional individuals—
in the betterment of a population. This, in turn, allows superior populations or races to supplant 
others. There has to be something that the elite can do. 
I will not attempt to adjudicate between intellectual and social explanations of Galton’s 
confused or confusing position on regression and selection, but I am prepared to propose that 
social commitments are the key to explaining his concerns about regression. What the pattern of 
regression means is that the offspring of individuals at the extreme of the range for any given 
trait are, with rare exceptions, less extreme. What is not true is that this leads over a number of 
generations to the population losing its extreme values. Each generation will have its exceptional 
individuals, so the only consequence of regression towards the mean is that exceptional 
individuals in one generation cannot rely on biological heredity to guarantee that their offspring 
will be part of the next generation’s exceptional individuals. Galton’s investigations of 
regression and correlation, therefore, provided no biological justification for elites to do 
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something they are well able to do socially, namely, place one’s son “in a more favorable 
position for advancement, than if he has been the son of an ordinary person” (1865, 161). The 
pattern of regression, which occurs for any two correlated variables, is not by itself a problem 
when understanding or manipulating biological inheritance. However, in Galton’s project of 
human betterment, regression was a problem because it detracted from the case for social 
inheritance. This then is my answer to the chapter’s title question.  
Such an answer shifts the focus from biological to social inheritance. To do so I have had 
to make reference to what is implicit in the logic of Galton’s work on regression (Theme 1.3; 
Taylor 2006). The social interpretation does, however, find some explicit support. In the 1892 
preface Galton states: 
The question to be solved relates to the hereditary permanence of the several [social] 
classes. What proportion of each class is descended from parents who belong to the same 
class, and what proportion is descended from parents who belong to each of the other 
classes? Do these persons who have honourably succeeded in life, and who are 
presumably, on the whole, the most valuable portion of our human stock, contribute on 
the aggregate their fair share of posterity to the next generation? (1892a, xxii). 
 
Nevertheless, let me concede that my interpretation is simple, paying little attention to the 
many particularities of Galton’s work (Stigler 1986, 265ff) and its social context (MacKenzie 
1981, Porter 1986, Waller 2001). One might note, for example, that, although Galton’s financial 
independence resulted from a large inheritance, he took steps to factor out the effects of social 
inheritance in his early biographical investigations of whether eminent men tend to have eminent 
relatives. As he explains, his focus on eminence in science and literature came from a choice to 
exclude the army and legislature because “neither…  afford, in the highest ranks, an open arena 
to the ablest intellects” (1865, 161). In other words, the elites whose reproduction Galton was 
concerned with were not from the aristocratic upper class (who secured their position by means 
other than their intellect), but, as MacKenzie (1981) argues, were from the new professional 
middle class. (My interpretation has clear affinities with MacKenzie's, but he sees Galton's work 
on regression and correlation in terms of a general project of understanding the laws of heredity; 
MacKenzie does not delve into why Galton was specifically concerned about regression to the 
mean.) 
 24 
At the same time, my simple formulation fits the intent of an opening-up theme (Theme 
1.1). It invites interpretation of science in terms not stated literally by the scientist—or, at least, 
not given emphasis by Galton—terms that refer to the scientist’s conceptions of “what we can 
do.”  In this way, my social interpretation of Galton’s concern with regression invites delving 
further into the complexities of this and related cases even as the interpretation itself is easy to 
absorb (Taylor 2005). In summary, my account of Galton illustrates two more themes, which 
build on themes 1.2-1.5: 
Theme 1.6: In his understanding of regression and correlation, Galton’s investigations of 
biological heredity incorporated a concern with justifying social inheritance. 
Theme 1.7: Science open to interpretation. Theories of scientists can be interpreted as 
representing more than what they explicitly refer to. 
 
III. Why we might be concerned about Galton’s concern about “regression to the mean.” 
Most statisticians who use the term regression do not know its original connotations, let 
alone share Galton’s concerns. Statistical methods for modern regression analysis are more 
varied and mathematically sophisticated than Galton could have dealt with. Nevertheless, certain 
social and scientific issues opened up by Galton’s concerns about regression towards the mean 
remain relevant today. Let me identify three of these. 
The first issue concerns the ideal of meritocracy, in which social resources are allocated 
on the basis of merit, somehow defined, and not according to family membership (i.e., social 
inheritance) or other forms of patronage. As defined, this ideal does not exclude biological 
inheritance of merit (or of inborn potential to gain merit). However, attempts to bring such 
inheritance into meritocracy can be influenced by assumptions about social possibilities. In the 
meritocratic vein, Galton, as we have seen, implied that the “ablest intellects” could be 
recognized—at least in the fields of science and literature. Yet, if each generation were able to 
identify its ablest intellects and promote them to high social position, then the quality of these 
leaders would not be diminished by regression towards the mean among the offspring of the 
previous generation’s leaders. This was not a line of thought that Galton pursued. We might be 
surprised if he had given that identification of the ablest offspring across the whole of society 
and educating them accordingly was not something that he or his contemporaries could do (or 
imagine doing). Galton’s vision of human betterment centered instead on ensuring eugenic 
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marriages, which would be an extension of a practice that was very familiar and do-able among 
Galton’s class, namely, the choice of marriage partners with a view to advancement of one’s 
social and financial position. The benefit of such marriages for society’s leaders and elites would 
be diminished by regression towards the mean for their offspring. Regression would slow 
progress towards a future in which the merit of the elite—Galton's “galaxy of genius”—would be 
based in their biological inheritance. 
It is interesting to probe the social commitments of those in more recent times who 
expound biological inheritance of merit. By the mid-twentieth century, compulsory schooling 
and intelligence testing seemed to make a meritocratic allocation of resources appear something 
we in liberal democracies can do. Consider, then, the case of H. J. Eysenck, a leading proponent 
in England of intelligence testing. Eysenck arranged for Galton’s Hereditary Genius to be 
reprinted in 1978 and in his introduction referred to Plato’s ideal of rulers being charged (by the 
gods) to “scrutiniz[e] each child to see what metal has gone to his making, and then allocate or 
promote him accordingly” (Eysenck 1978, i). This introduction celebrates Galton as the founder 
of behavioral genetics, a field that has established the “strong genetic determinants of ability” 
(Eysenck 1978, i) and shown that the “whole pyramidal structure of… all advanced societies… 
is probably in large measure due to the inherited inequalities in mental ability” (Eysenck 1978, 
vi). Box 1.1 presents an exchange with Eysenck (an imaginary one; he died in 1997) to call forth 
what is implicit in this explicit advocacy of meritocracy based on biological inheritance. 
 
Box 1.1. An exchange with Eysenck about meritocracy 
Taylor [T]: Why are you so concerned about genetic determination of mental ability? 
Eysenck [E]: If abilities are determined by birth and society can predict who will be naturally 
talented, then it can allocate its resources more efficiently, for example, through separation of 
school children into separate tracks. 
T: Why not test young people and use the results to make such predictions—then we can forget 
the issue of where their abilities originate? You have, after all, been a life-long proponent of 
mental testing. 
E: If abilities are biologically inherited and society is meritocratic, then elites are biological 
elites. 
T: And so…? 
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E:  Rather than wait until children are old enough to be tested for intelligence, we can allocate 
resources from birth onward according to their parents’ status. 
T:  High status parents already do that. Wouldn’t someone who does not believe in 
meritocracy—someone who prefers a system that perpetuates privilege—also support the 
practice you propose? 
E: The difference is that I would use intelligence tests at eleven, sixteen, and so on to check that 
the right children have been placed on the advanced tracks. 
T:  Then, again, why not simply use such testing and forget the heredity issues?—especially 
given that parental intelligence is an imperfect predictor of offspring intelligence. 
E:   Even if starting to track children at an early age leads to some errors, it is probably a more 
efficient allocation of educational resources. 
T:  Efficient for whom?—You must know that tracking in practice means more than providing 
different kinds of education;  time and again it has resulted in unequal allocation of resources 
(Oakes 2005). 
E:  That does not have to be the case. 
T:  Maybe not, but unless you can show that unequal allocation has never been the case in the 
past, how could you show that the current “pyramidal structure” of society is due to “inherited 
inequalities in mental ability”? 
 
The last question of the exchange with Eysenck points to a larger methodological issue: 
how can intelligence testers and behavioral geneticists tease apart the various contributions to the 
development of intelligence? The tests that Eysenck proposes above for adolescents must also 
reflect the effects of any differential allocation of educational resources since birth. Even if 
intelligence testers could discount these effects, what do they envisage policy-makers being able 
to with their claim that intelligence is genetically determined? To push researchers on these 
questions is to probe their social commitments, to attempt to expose their views on what we can 
or could do. As historian of science Carson (2006) describes, the source and significance of 
inequalities in people’s talents have been revealingly contentious issues since the Enlightenment. 
A second important issue opened up by Galton’s concerns about regression is the 
persistence of typological thinking. This aspect of Galton’s worldview is evident when we still 
say, for example, that “men tend to be taller than women,” or “men, on average, are taller than 
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women.”  (The emphasis here is on the type, with the deviation from it a secondary matter. Have 
you ever heard someone try to subvert this by saying “the spread of heights for men is centered 
at a higher value than the spread of heights for women”?) When the more careful terms of 
statistical analysis are used, measurements of the heights of men and women are compared by 
examining the differences between the means of men’s heights and the means of women’s 
heights in relation to the spread of values around these means (using the "t test"). Deviation is 
taken into account, yet such analysis treats the spread away from the mean as if it happened by 
chance. In other words, the mean is the real value around which there are chance deviations.  
Now, it might be objected that a typological worldview does not apply to the analysis of 
correlations between sets of measurements; correlation, after all, focuses not on the means but on 
the variation. (To back up this objection, notice that the slope of the regression line can be high 
or low independently of the relative sizes of the means of the correlated variables.) My response 
would be that typological thinking persists in this area as well, to the extent that statisticians 
portray this variation as a spectrum of types that any observed individual is an imperfect 
expression of. Let me give an example of typological thinking regarding correlation. 
 Stigler, a statistician as well as a historian of statistics, presents a way to visualize 
regression to the mean that revolves around dividing each observation into a “permanent 
component [due to skill and] a degree of luck (a transient component)” (Stigler 1997, 104). He 
invites us to imagine that we observe the same individuals twice, measuring the same trait, say, 
the score in two exams on the same subject. He argues that many who scored highly on the first 
will have done so because their luck component was positive. They would retain their skill 
component the second time but have luck that might be negative or positive. Among a group of 
such people, luck will average out to zero; in other words, their second scores will average lower 
than their first—hence, there will be regression. 
Stigler's typological construal of correlation makes it hard to visualize that there may be a 
diversity of processes of development leading to the different data points. Neither luck nor an 
unchanging type is required to produce the pattern of regression towards the mean. To illustrate 
this counterpoint, consider the following, non-typological alternative to let me Stigler’s verbal 
explanation of regression. Recall that the regression line is the “best predictor” line for a cloud of 
points that represent two measurements on each member of a set of individuals. (That is, this line 
can be used to predict one measurement based on the other. The prediction is not perfect, but the 
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discrepancies are the minimum possible.) Now let an ellipse stand in for that cloud (figure 1.6). 
If the measurements have, as before, been scaled so that the spread (standard deviation) is equal 
in both directions, the long axis of the ellipse will be a line of slope 1. Any vertical slice of that 
ellipse on the right will have fewer values above its long axis than below. (Readers can check 
this readily by drawing an ellipse and rotating it around its center.) The average of the values in 
any slice must be less than the value on the long axis; the best predictor line has to go as close as 
possible to the averages of all the slices; the best predictor or regression line must, therefore, 
have a slope less than 1. (For the actual cloud of data points, there may be some vertical slices of 
points on the right of the center that happen to have an average above the long axis of the ellipse, 
but as we move towards the slices on the far right, the ellipse is thinner and that occurrence will 
be rarer.) Once one sees that vertical slices of any ellipse sloped at an angle to the horizontal will 
have this property nothing more is needed to understand the pattern of regression towards the 
mean. In sum, although it remains an open question what the processes were that generated any 
specific data points, these processes need not be conceived in Stigler's typological way.  
In light of this last point, a third issue opened up by Galton’s concerns is how directly we 
expect patterns to provide insight about processes. Galton chose the term regression because he 
saw it as a dynamic process counterposed to another dynamic process, namely, “deviation” (from 
the mean). Even though he came to appreciate that regression towards the mean occurred in any 
set of correlated data, the connotations of process colored his interpretation of the patterns: “The 
selection of the most serviceable variations cannot even produce any great degree of… 
improvement, because an equilibrium between deviation and regression will soon be reached” 
(1892a, xviii; see Porter 1986, 287-9).  
When statisticians today use the term regression and deviation, the connotations of 
process that held for Galton are no longer obvious. (Indeed, “regression” is now used as a purely 
technical label for formulas that best predict one measurement on the basis of other 
measurements.) Nevertheless, a legacy remains in how the pattern-to-process relationship is 
conceived. Consider the concept of a regression line as a best predictor line. To predict one 
measurement from another is to hint at, or to invite, causal interpretation. Granted, if we have the 
additional information that the second measurement follows the first in time—as is the case for 
offspring and parental traits—a causal interpretation in the opposite direction is ruled out. But 
there is nothing about the association between correlated variables, whether temporally ordered 
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or not, that requires it to be assessed in terms of how well the first predicts the second —let alone 
whether the predictions provide insight about the causal process.  
After all—although this is rarely made clear to students in statistics classes—the 
correlation is not only the slope of the regression line when the two measurements are scaled to 
have equal spread, but it also measures how tightly the cloud of points is packed around the line 
of slope 1 (or slope -1 for a negative correlation). (Technically, when both measurements are 
scaled to have a standard deviation of 1, the average of the squared perpendicular distance from 
the points to the line of slope 1 or -1 is equal to 1 minus the absolute value of the correlation 
[Weldon 2000]. This means that the larger the correlation, the tighter the packing.) This 
tightness-of-packing view of correlation affords no priority to one measurement over the other. 
Whereas the typical emphasis in statistical analysis on prediction often fosters causal thinking, a 
non-directional view of correlation reminds us that additional knowledge always has to be 
brought in if the patterns in data are used to support causal claims or hypotheses.  
This last point recalls the classroom activity in section I. With regard to the need for 
additional knowledge in order to support causal claims, it is no revelation that, even if these 
heights of offspring and same-sex parent are correlated, the process of reproduction and 
development of height involves the other-sex parent as well!  But there are less obvious or more 
contentious patterns in parent-offspring correlations that are not easy to interpret in terms of 
process. For example, correlations among genetic relatives in IQ test scores coexist with a 
generational trend in Western societies of increases in a population’s average IQ test score 
(Flynn 1994). There has been no genetic change in the population to account for the trend; nor is 
there any simple environmental explanation, such as dietary improvement or increased years in 
school. To account for the pattern, we need to investigate the more complex dynamics of 
individual development and social change. We might need to take into account the ways in 
which a child can elicit responses from parents, responses moreover that may be modulated by 
the prevailing social customs (Dickens and Flynn 2001). We might also need to expose 
heterogeneous factors underlying the development of the “same” value of a trait among different 
individuals (Taylor 2008). Indeed, if researchers find a way to explain the processes of 
development of human traits in a way that encompasses both the patterns of average increase in 
IQ test scores and their variability, they should be able to offer insights about what we can do to 
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promote human betterment—insights that eluded the typological-thinking, pattern-process-
conflating Galton. 
In summary, probing Galton’s concern about “regression to the mean” allows us, in the 
spirit of themes 1.1 and 1.3, to open up social and scientific issues that still require examination 
and clarification to this day: 
Theme 1.8: Confused/ing discourse about meritocracy: Is the central concern allocation 
of social resources based on merit or justification of social inheritance? 
Theme 1.9: Typological thought persists in statistical analysis and explanation. 
Theme 1.10: Distraction from dynamics of development. Drawing direct connections 
from pattern to process distracts us from paying attention to more complex dynamics of 
development of human traits in a social context.  
 
State of play: Issues puzzled through; issues left open 
Reflecting on what I, as a teacher and writer, can do (Theme 1.2), I chose for this chapter 
not to delve into the complexities of some specific case of science-in-process. Instead, I set out to 
motivate simple themes of a certain kind, namely, those that open up questions and point to 
further work needed to grapple with the complexities in particular cases (Theme 1.1). Galton's 
work that made foundational contributions to the development of statistics cannot be explained 
simply in terms of an ideology supporting the perpetuation of privilege. Yet, by examining the 
logic of his inquiries (and his confusions) regarding biological inheritance, I was able to point to 
his implicit concern with justifying social inheritance (Theme 1.6). Further historical research on 
this concern is called for. I also point to certain social and scientific issues that still require 
examination and clarification, namely, confusions about the relationship between meritocracy 
and heredity, the persistence of typological thinking, and how directly we expect patterns to 




Bridge 1: From Environmental Complexity to Social Epidemiology 
 
To set the scene for the next chapter, let me provide some background behind the very 
first three themes in Chapter 1, especially the contrast drawn between the complexity of 
particular cases and simple themes (Theme 1.1).  
In my teaching and writing from the late 1980s into the 2000s, my focus was on studies 
of environment, society, and science. I tried to address the following tension: On one hand, 
accounts built around simple themes are readily conveyed and digested by a wide audience, for 
example, population growth needs to be slowed given that it is a major source of environmental 
degradation. On the other hand, accounts of multi-stranded complexity in particular situations 
may be more faithful to the actual processes, not only in the situations that researchers study, but 
also at the level of the social situations in which researchers undertake their studies and influence 
others with their results (Taylor 2005, 167ff). I will return to the simple side shortly.  
On the situations that researchers study, my own scientific research during the 1980s had 
led me to a picture of ecological complexity as unruly, in the sense that “there is ongoing change 
in the structure of situations that have built up over time from heterogeneous components and are 
embedded… within wider dynamics” (Taylor 2005, xiii). That picture prepared me to appreciate 
the virtues and challenges of a form of political ecology in which the complexity of social and 
environmental dynamics is analyzed in terms of intersecting and conflicting economic, social, 
and ecological processes operating at different scales. These intersecting processes range from 
the local institutions of production and their associated agroecologies, the social differentiation 
in a given community and its social psychology of norms and reciprocal expectations, through to 
national and international political economic changes. During the 1990s political ecology and 
intersecting processes was central to my teaching and writing (Taylor and García Barrios 1995).  
On the social situations in which researchers do their work, a current in the social studies 
of science emerging in the late 1980s highlighted the ways that scientists employ or mobilize 
diverse resources: equipment, experimental protocols, citations, the support of colleagues, the 
reputations of laboratories, metaphors, rhetorical devices, publicity, funding, and so on (Latour 
1987, Law 1987, Clarke and Fujimura 1992, Clarke 2005). This picture of employing diversity 
resources to establish knowledge certainly matched my personal experience during the late 1970s 
pursuing quantitative research on the socio-environmental future of a salt-affected agricultural 
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region in Australia. As I began to make contributions to the social studies of science in the late 
1980s, I explored and extended this view of complexity of science-in-the-making, which I called 
heterogeneous construction (Taylor 1992, 1995).  
Given my background as a scientist, I was interested in social studies of science feeding 
back into scientific practice—and vice versa. This interest led me to explore cross-fertilization or 
cross-interrogation between heterogeneous construction and intersecting processes (Taylor 
2011). One idea was that anyone wanting to influence developments in some area of science 
would benefit having some kind of map of the complexity of their resources or practical 
commitments. Such maps, whether assembled by interpreters of science (Taylor 1992) or by the 
researchers themselves (Taylor 1989), would point to multiple places at which concrete 
alternative resources could be mobilized, which might allow researchers, taking into account 
their own background and interests, to identify specific changes that they could effect. In this 
way, change in science would be guided by interpretations of the diversity of things scientists do 
in practice. 
One consequence of the diverse-resources interpretation of science-in-the-making is that 
each case or each map would have their own idiosyncratic complexity. Examining such 
complexity may be stimulating to a group of specialists interested in the particularities of the 
given case, but readily becomes too much information for a wider audience. Suppose, however, 
the audience I wished to engage were just myself? In this spirit, I reflected on the social situation 
in which I worked in the late 1990s and saw that my family and work commitments, as well as 
my disposition and training as a scientist, were not conducive to the extended periods in the field 
in foreign countries needed to learn more about, collaborate with, and ultimately influence 
political ecologists. Yet, I was now in the Boston area close to many public health schools. 
Given my training and skills in quantitative methods, it was possible to imagine learning more 
about, collaborating with, and ultimately influencing researchers, especially social 
epidemiologists, trying to analyze the complexity of social and biological factors in the 
development of behavioral and medical conditions over any people's lifetimes. Such complexity 
in lifecourse development paralleled the three components of unruly environmental complexity 
noted above: the heterogeneity of factors; development or ongoing restructuring; and 
embeddedness of the individual’s development in wider social dynamics. I sketched a plan for 
myself to bring interpretation of science-in-the-making reflexively into a field of science that I 
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would, in some place, become embedded in. How well this plan fared I take stock of later, in 
Bridge qq (after Chapter qq).  
The single-person path of the previous paragraph aside, I had not given up on influencing 
students and readers to delve into the practical and intellectual complexities of engaging with 
particular complex situations. It would be an impossible task to provide maps of the complexity 
for multiple cases that span the interests of some audience. I might, however, guide or inform the 
choices that students and readers made as they went on to shape their own paths into that 
complexity. I might even just aim to stimulate students and readers to think about aspects of 
complexity to which they had not given much or any attention before. This takes us back to the 
simple side of the initial contrast. 
One pedagogical-expository approaches I had pursued was to motivate simple themes 
that, although readily conveyed and digested, at the same time open up questions and point to 
further work needed to grapple with the complexities in particular cases (Theme 1.1; Taylor 
2005). Addressing the what we can do of Theme 1.2, the aim would not for the simple themes to 
come across as lessons or knowledge claims (even in the form of ideal types or abstract 
generalizations) that might empower readers or students when they accepted them. The intended 
relationship of such themes to change is more modest: they add to the tool box of ideas that 
students or readers draw from to assemble a response to any new situation in its typical 
complexity. A complementary pedagogical-expository approach, evident in Chapter 1, was to 
use close examination of concepts and methods within the science to stimulate inquiries into the 
social influences shaping that science, and reciprocally (Theme 1.3). 
 Another pedagogical-expository approach I formulated, which will be evident in Chapter 
2, revolved around construing critical thinking as understanding ideas and practices better when 
we examine them in relation to alternatives (Taylor 2002). Ultimately, a critical thinker has to 
identify alternatives for themselves in areas they had not realized even needed questioning. In the 
interim, however, I could seed the garden of critical thinking by comparing questions, concepts, 
and methods of different fields. In turn, opening up themes, asking what we can do, and 
reciprocal animation (Themes 1.1-1.3) could be brought into play. Indeed, it was this framing, 
not my plan of seeking to become embedded somewhere within social epidemiology, that I used 
when applying successfully for funding that would allow me to shift focus from environmental 
studies to social epidemiology.  
Chapter 2 
Genes, Gestation, and Life Experiences:  
Critical Thinking about Studies of the Complexities of Environment and Development in 
the Age of DNA 
 
During the mid-1990s to early 2000s I was struck by three fields studying biological and 
social development in ways that complicated the persistent contrasts: inborn and unchangeable 
versus environmental and changeable; and biological versus social. There were shown to be 
marked increases in IQ test scores from one generation to the next—How, I wondered, would 
behavioral genetics, which had focused on establishing the high heritability of traits, respond to 
that? There were findings that environmental circumstances during gestation may be associated 
with chronic diseases of later life—a form of environmental determinism—How would critics of 
behavioral genetics, who argued that genetic does not mean unchangeable, respond to that? 
How would all these fields respond to research that teases apart the complexities of environment 
to link severe events and difficulties over a person's life course with the onset of mental or 
physical illness? In 2002 I wrote a programmatic article with a view to drawing readers into 
critical thinking and subsequent inquiry based on holding different approaches to genes, 
gestation, and life experiences in tension with alternatives. 
 
Theme 2.1. Critical thinking entails understanding ideas and practices better when we 
examine them in relation to alternatives (Taylor 2002).  
 
Everyone knows that genes and environment, nature and nurture, interact. But, in this 
Age of DNA, genetics is often seen as the way to expose the important or root causes of 
behavior and disease and as the best route to effective therapeutic technologies. Widespread 
public attention is given to claims that social policies and actions built on broader bases are 
scientifically or economically ineffective–The Bell Curve (Herrnstein and Murray 1994) 
provides the most notable recent episode. 
At a different level, the dominance of genetics is also reflected within social studies of 
science. Critical light has been shed on the history, semantic complexity, politics, ethics and 
other dimensions of genetics, but very little interpretive scholarship concerns the sciences of, for 
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example, educational interventions or psychological development. In general, the environment is 
under-examined and construed in simple terms. For example, many teachers and commentators 
on science in its social context—myself included—have invoked phenylketonuria (PKU) to 
demonstrate that genetic does not mean unchangeable. However, Paul's history of screening for 
PKU shows that the certainty of severe cognitive impairment has been replaced by a chronic 
disease with a new set of problems. Moreover, even in this case where the condition has a clear-
cut link to a single changed gene, complexities of the social environment have shaped the ways 
that society makes use of knowledge about that condition (Paul 1997). 
The “mystique” of genetics (Nelkin and Lindee 1995) is by no means fading, but several 
scientific currents are bringing the environment, in different variants, back into the picture. In 
evolutionary biology, a great deal of attention is now given to the plasticity of phenotypes across 
a range of environments (Sultan 1992). Developmental biology, filling the gap between genes 
and the characters they shape, is experiencing a renaissance. Although the field still focuses 
mainly on embryological or early development, the influence of the environment is now 
acknowledged even for those stages (van der Weele 1995, Gilbert 1997). Behavioral genetics, 
once firmly directed towards establishing the heritability of traits, now highlights the effects of 
non-shared environmental influences, i.e., those not experienced equally by members of the 
same family. Among such non-shared influences, Sulloway (1996) has argued that birth order 
may be a key factor in explaining conformity to or rebellion against authority in intellectual and 
other spheres of social life. 
Many questions arise once we try to make sense of the ways that scientists conceptualize 
the environment.  What meanings are given to the term, and how have these changed over time 
and in response to criticism? What is measured and what is explained? What methodologies are 
employed for collecting data and making inferences? What is the status of the different natural 
and social sciences involved? How are these colored by past and present associations with 
political currents? 
With such questions in mind, I have begun to examine the development and reception of 
three areas of social epidemiology. (I use this term broadly to denote research that correlates 
traits in general, not only disease incidence, to antecedent factors in defined populations and 
attempts to determine the causal processes by which the traits develop over time.) Each approach 
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complicates the persistent, albeit often qualified, contrasts: inborn and unchangeable versus 
environmental and changeable; and biological versus social. The areas are: 
a. Research on gestational programming, which has identified associations between nutrition 
during critical periods in utero and diseases of late life, including heart disease, diabetes, 
and death by suicide (Barker 1994);  
b. Life events and difficulties research, which has exposed relationships between severe events 
and difficulties over a person's life course and the onset of mental or physical illness 
(Harris 2000); and  
c. Reciprocal causation models of IQ development in which there is a matching of traits and the 
changing environments in which traits develop so as to allow both high heritability and 
large gains from one generation to the next (Dickens and Flynn 2001). 
  
In this chapter I do not delve deeply into any of these approaches, but provide an 
introduction and overview sufficient, I hope, to bring more attention to the complexities of the 
environment and to the ways scientists account for the development of behavioral and medical 
conditions over any individual's lifetime. As part of exploring the significance of the three 
approaches, I identify various ways that they challenge each other as well as challenging more 
traditional accounts of gene-environment interactions from behavioral geneticists and from 
critics of biological determinism. 
 
I. Five approaches to gene-environment complexities 
 
Gestational Programming 
Several research groups, most notably Barker's group at the University of Southampton, 
have located data on body size and body shape at birth for cohorts of individuals and related 
these data to diseases arising in these individuals later in life (Barker 1994, 1995a, Scrimshaw 
1997). Associations have been found between nutrition during critical periods in utero and 
diseases of late life, including heart disease, diabetes, and death by suicide (Barker et al. 1995). 
The associations stand out even after allowing for confounding associations between 
socioeconomic status, low birth weight, and adult diseases. It appears that, through gestational 
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programming of biochemical patterns and cell distribution within organs, disease susceptibility 
can be inborn, yet with origins that are environmental, not genetic (Figure 2.1).  
Qqwhat is interestingqq 
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Figure 2.1. A model and observations in which nutrition during critical periods in utero 






Within epidemiology, gestational programming has been subject both to critical 
commentary (Paneth 1994, Paneth and Susser 1995, Kramer and Joseph 1996) and to 
confirmation by former sceptics (Frankel et al. 1996). A major objection has been that 
gestational programming does not explain temporal and international trends in coronary heart 
disease. For example, heart disease rose in countries like Scotland, Finland or Norway, where 
birthweights have been among the world’s highest. Work on Finnish data suggests ways to 
resolve such apparent inconsistencies. Tracing the ways that Westernization plays out over a 
number of generations, it turns out that women who were born small, but who, with increasing 
affluence, became overweight for their size, tended to have thin offspring who, although well 
nourished, had higher risk of heart disease (Forsén et al. 1997). Barker's group is now examining 
such contingencies and combining their findings with mechanisms of low growth rate during 
different periods of pregnancy (Barker 1995a) and with factors related to body weight and 
growth in childhood and adult life (Barker, pers. comm; see also Frankel et al. 1996). 
 
Life events and difficulties 
Another line of research from England, initiated by the sociologists Brown and Harris in 
the late 1960s, investigates how severe events and difficulties during people's life course 
influence the onset of mental and physical illnesses (Brown and Harris 1989a, Harris 2000). The 
most sustained research in this tradition involves explaining depression in working-class women. 
For a district of London in the early 1970s, Brown and Harris used interviews, ratings of 
transcripts (done blind, that is, without knowledge of the whether the woman became depressed), 
and statistical analyses. They identified four factors as disproportionately the case for women 
with severe depression: a severe, adverse event in the year prior to the onset of depression; the 
lack of a supportive partner; persistently difficult living conditions; and the loss of, or prolonged 
separation from, the mother when the woman was a child under the age of eleven (Brown and 
Harris 1978, 1989b). A reconstruction of Brown and Harris' work by developmental 
psychologist Bowlby (1988) suggests how the different aspects of class, family, and psychology 
can build on each other in the life course of the individual (Figure 2.2; see also Taylor 1995). 
Let me give some simplified and over-generalized examples of such cross-connections: 
In a society in which women are expected to be the primary caregivers for children, the loss of a 
mother increases the chances of, or is linked to, the child lacking consistent, reliable support for 
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at least some period. (Bowlby added his own speculation about early childhood attachment 
problems.) An adolescent girl in such a disrupted family or sent from such a family to a custodial 
institution is likely to see a marriage or partnership with a man as a positive alternative, yet such 
early marriages tend to break up more easily. Working-class origins tend to lead to working-
class adulthood, in which living conditions are more difficult, especially if a woman has children 
to look after and provide for on her own. And, in these circumstances, accidents and other severe 
events are more likely. The consequence of a severe event is often, unless there is a supportive 




Figure 2.2. Pathways to severe depression in a study of working-class women. The dashed lines 
in the top diagram (based on Bowlby 1988) indicate that each strand tends to build on what has 




The Life Events and Difficulties methodology attempts to integrate “the quantitative 
analyses of epidemiology and the [in] depth understanding of the case history approach” (Brown 
and Harris 1989a, x). The case history interviews allow contextual rating of events. For example, 
the death of a relative after a long illness has a different meaning from the sudden death of a 
relative on whom one depended for financial or emotional support. This methodology has been 
applied for many illnesses, including heart attacks, disorders of menstruation, and multiple 
sclerosis, but most commonly for psychological disorders. Different contributing factors are 
identified in different illnesses, which is to be expected. Further inquiry has been motivated by 
the results being less clear cut than for the 1970s London depression study and by considerable 
unexplained variation remaining. Another concern for Life Events and Difficulties researchers 
has been achieving recognition and adoption of their approach in the United States, where 
conventional check-list surveys still dominate the study of associations between life events and 
illnesses (Brown and Harris 1989a, x-xi; Brown 1989). 
Before introducing the third area of epidemiology—reciprocal causation models of IQ 
development—it will help if I provide overviews of more traditional accounts of gene-




The field of behavioral genetics attempts to identify the contribution of inherited factors 
on specific behaviors and on general psychological measures, most notably IQ. Traditionally, the 
field has used statistical tools derived from the field of quantitative genetics to estimate 
heritability of traits measured across populations of related and unrelated individuals. (In terms 
of the Analysis of Variance, heritability is said to be high if the variation among the averages for 
genetic types/varieties over the environments or locations in which they grow is a large fraction 
of the total variation among the individuals represented in the data.) As in quantitative genetics, 
no genes or DNA are actually studied (Figure qq2.3) but a model of genetic influence on 
development is implied (Figure 2.qq4). More recently, however, research has involved the 
search for sites on the genome that make a contribution, in combination with many other sites, to 




qqFigure 2.3. The basic statistical quality of heritability as defined by quantitative genetics. 
 
Figure 2.4. The model of development implicit in quantitative genetics. 
 
The credibility of the first line of research rose in the late 1980s, riding on the results 
from the Minnesota Study of Twins. Compared with earlier studies, recent behavioral genetic 
methodology has been more careful and based on larger samples. Significant heritability (up to 
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50%; occasionally higher) has been found for standard psychological measures and many other 
behaviors, including divorce rates, male homosexuality, and depression (Bouchard et al. 1990, 
McGue and Lykken 1992). Moreover, the residual effects appear to relate more to within-family 
differences rather than to the shared family environment, a finding that has elicited a great deal 
of speculation about causes (Bouchard et al. 1990, Plomin 1990, 118ff) and further investigation 
of within-family differences in upbringing (Hetherington et al. 1994). The search for sites on the 
genome, on the other hand, has been subject to methodological critique and several retracted or 
non-replicated claims, but researchers continue with varying degrees of caution and confidence 
about the power of their methods to yield reliable results (Aldhous 1992, Science 1994). 
 
Scientific criticism of biological determinism 
The main angles of scientific opposition to the field of behavioral genetics and its 
contribution to genetic determinist views about human social behavior have been that: 
a.  In the case of an individual, genetic causes cannot be partitioned from environmental 
causes. Much confusion on this score arises from the use of the terms heritability, genetic, and 
environmental in the context of statistical partitioning of variation within a population of 
individuals subject to a specific range of environments (Lewontin 1974b). 
b.  Heritability is not logically or empirically related to differences among the average 
values of groups nor to difficulty of changing the trait in question (Lewontin 1982, Block 1995). 
c.  Behavioral geneticists, although aware of the preceding two points, rarely incorporate 
them into their interpretations and on-going research (Schiff and Lewontin 1986, 220-222). They 
quickly discount (Plomin et al. 1990, 350), or do not even mention (Bouchard and Propping 
1993), results showing that IQ of adopted children, although correlated with that of their birth 
mothers, is on average significantly higher. 
d.  Environmental or social factors can influence psychological traits, IQ, and other 
measurable behaviors greatly, as indicated, for example, by the effect on IQ of adoption up the 
socioeconomic scale (Schiff and Lewontin 1986) and by the Flynn effect—the steady 
improvement over time of IQ scores in most countries (Flynn 1987). 
e.  Behavioral genetic analyses have been based on flawed methodology and unreliable data 




Despite their belief in the validity of these points, some critics of biological determinism 
have expressed a sense of vulnerability. Stewart (1979), for example, asked what would happen 
to their critique if a methodologically tight study demonstrated a clear DNA-behavior connection 
in the etiology, say, of schizophrenia in some sufferers (see Gottesman 1991). The tighter 
methodology and results in recent behavioral genetics can only add to these concerns. 
Furthermore, significant caveats are now attached to the examples oft-quoted to demonstrate that 
change is quite possible. In addition to the account of Paul (1997) on PKU screening, Woodhead 
(1988) has examined the contextual factors that contribute to sustained effects after early 
educational interventions such as Headstart programs in the U.S. 
  
Models of reciprocal causation of any individual's developing traits and environment 
Recent reciprocal causation models of IQ development attempt to reconcile two 
observations that might appear incompatible, namely, high heritability reported for IQ (Neisser 
et al. 1996) and large gains from one generation to the next (Flynn 1987). These models allow 
for both observations through a matching of traits and the changing environments in which traits 
develop (Dickens and Flynn 2001). Such matching would occur when the higher IQ child seeks 
out or is provided with qq“cognitively enriching experiences” beyond those in a standard school 
setting. Matching means that small differences at birth can be amplified, especially if every 
individual's environment follows society-wide trends that result from many other individuals' 
changes (Figure 2.5). Furthermore, the environment can play a significant role without lowering 





Figure qq2.5. The reciprocal causation model of Dickens and Flynn (2001), in which there is a 
matching of traits and the changing environments in which traits develop. 
 
Plausible parameters inserted into reciprocal causation models not only yield high 
heritability and generational gains, but also allow for decay of IQ gains after Headstart and other 
short-term enrichment programs (i.e., non-matching environments) end. Particular sets of data 
have yet, however, to be fitted to the models or used to discriminate among alternative forms of 
reciprocal causation (Loehlin 2002). 
 
II. Some ways that the approaches challenge each other 
 
To draw out the significance of research into Gestational programming (GP), Life events 
and difficulties (LED), and Reciprocal causation (RC) models of IQ development, let me map 
various ways that these three approaches challenge each other. I also map ways that they 
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challenge more traditional accounts of gene-environment interactions emerging from behavioral 
genetics (BG) and from criticism of biological determinism (CBD). Notice that, because CBD 




GP challenges LED. To the extent that LED research seeks to account for more of the 
variation among individuals who experience comparable life events, it may be productive for it 
to incorporate the effects of gestational nutrition. GP and LED, as well as BG, have examined 
heart disease (Forsén et al. 1997, Neilson et al. 1989, Ewart 1994, Barker 1995b), so this would 
be an obvious locus of comparison among the approaches. 
GP challenges BG. The research design and analyses of BG rely heavily on the 
independence of environments for twins separated in infancy (Bouchard and Propping 1993). 
The findings of gestational programming indicate that separated twins have significant shared 
environments, namely, the gestational environment. Behavioral geneticists may, therefore, need 
to reconsider their reports of high heritabilities for behavioral differences and the method of twin 
studies may have to be reevaluated. With respect to the question of environmental influences 
experienced by biological or adopted siblings, the shared or non-shared gestational environments 
also need to be taken into consideration.  
GP challenges CBD. Critics of genetic determinist views now face in GP a biological 
determinism that has clear environmental causes. That is, once the individual has experienced 
the adverse nutrition regime as a fetus, it is predisposed towards the corresponding diseases of 
older age. Should the critics view these findings of GP favorably, or develop a critique 
equivalent to that of behavioral genetics outlined above? 
GP challenges RC. In the same way that GP has begun to resolve some inconsistencies 
among findings in different countries, RC could address the historical contingencies of social 
change in different countries. (In this vein Woodhead 1988 summarizes studies explaining how 
the IQ increases produced by Headstart programs tend to be transient yet in the long term the 
children end up with significantly higher high school graduation rates, employment, and many 




Life events and difficulties research 
LED challenges GP. As indicated earlier in the case of Finland, GP is beginning to 
resolve apparent inconsistencies by incorporating the contingencies of changing gestational 
conditions from one generation to the next. In this work, as well as in attempts to incorporate 
factors from childhood and adult life, it could be productive for GP researchers to address both 
the findings and case history approach of LED research. 
LED challenges BG and CBD. The environmental analyses offered by critics of 
biological determinism and by behavioral geneticists are based on the possibility of finding 
correlations between the trait studied and distinct environmental factors. The analyses in BG and 
CBD differ mostly around whether the factors are shared by all in a family, e.g., socioeconomic 
status, or not. (Although Sulloway 1996 works outside behavioral genetics, his examination of a 
within-family difference for scientists, namely, their birth order, also relies on analysis of 
correlations.) LED methodology goes beyond correlational analysis by teasing apart the 
sequence of events in different individuals' lifetimes that render the individual vulnerable or 
protected from proximal causes that provoke onset (or recurrence) of the condition in question. 
In this way, LED research addresses malleability or non-malleability of behavioral outcomes 
without, in principle, requiring that genetic contributions are either ruled out or privileged as 
explanatory factors (Taylor 1995). 
LED challenges RC. Although RC models include a series of steps in an individual's 
development over time, each step is still formulated in terms around correlations of distinct, pre-
identified factors. In contrast, factors in LED emerge after events are rated according to their 
expected significance to the individual in their specific context. An equivalent context-sensitive 
method may help develop RC models to a point at which they can be fitted to particular sets of 
data and these data can be used to discriminate among alternative forms of the models. 
 
Reciprocal causation models 
RC challenges GP. For certain physical conditions, such as heart disease, the effect of 
gestational environment can be separated from later life experience, but the reciprocal causation 
during an individuals' life course may need to be incorporated to account for the unexplained 
variation among individuals, especially in the cases of IQ or behavioral conditions. 
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RC challenges LED. When LED researchers focus on explaining the onset (or 
recurrence) of the condition in question, considerable unexplained variation remains, leaving 
room for further inquiry into differential vulnerability. The relationship between personality and 
subsequent severe life events invites attention to cycles of reciprocal causation, which may, as 
RC models assume, amplify small initial differences. 
RC challenges BG. Behavioral geneticists are confident that high (within-group) 
heritabilities and large IQ differences between the averages for (socially-defined) racial groups 
are connected because the groups differ genetically and genes are the primary determinant of IQ. 
They see no plausible environmental factor that differs among groups and could account for the 
average difference. In the case, however, of large gains from one generation to the next (Flynn 
1987), environmental conditions must be invoked; the gains cannot be related to genetic changes 
in the populations over the time span of only one generation. By logical extension, RC models 
challenge BG's focus on genetic explanations of IQ development and variation. 
RC challenges CBD. CBD highlights the logical fact that high heritability does not 
prevent changing the trait in question by changing the environmental conditions. At the same 
time, critics have worked hard to expose flaws in studies purporting to show high heritability, 
even though by their own logic nothing should hang on the magnitude of the heritability. Critics 
need not contest every high heritability estimate, however, once it is recognized that RC models 
allow high heritability and a significant role for environmental conditions. Instead, the emphasis 
in CBD could shift to exposing and contesting the self-fulfilling quality of the matching. After 
all, RC models do not dictate that “cognitively enriching experiences” must be channeled only to 
those whose slightly higher IQ might lead them to seek out such experiences on their own. 
 
III. From commentary to engagement 
 
This chapter's introduction described the three approaches as complicating the persistent 
contrasts: inborn and unchangeable versus environmental and changeable; and biological versus 
social. In the previous section I wrote of the approaches challenging each other. In both cases I 
might have better said having the potential for complicating and challenging; further steps are 
needed to realize such potential. 
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One direction for these steps would involve commentators on science delving more 
deeply than my brief overviews have into the research involved in the different approaches. 
Writing about their intellectual history and current concerns—their questions, concepts, 
methods, and findings—should help readers see that much is overlooked when scientists and 
boosters of biotechnology claim that understanding of diseases or the development of normal 
traits will flow from sequencing DNA and determining the traits' genetic bases. A comparison of 
contrasting approaches, such as GP, LED, and RC, would enrich the discussion of the 
complexities of environmental influences on developing organisms, and would do so without 
setting environmental influence in opposition to genetic control. 
Another direction would involve commentary on the dynamics of science, exposing more 
of the relation between the approaches and their social context:  How is the research funded and 
organized? How are the methods and findings received in the scientific community and in 
society more broadly? How do the scientists respond to or resist criticisms of their work? How 
do they use metaphors and rhetoric to sway their audiences? Writing about such matters should 
help readers see that much is overlooked when accounts of science portray advances as a matter 
of scientists uncovering, to the extent of their current technical capacity, the workings of nature. 
Again, a comparison of contrasting approaches could be helpful, allowing researchers in the 
social studies of science and technology to affirm that the workings of science are not simply or 
directly driving towards increased understanding of reality. (The possibilities of comparison 
entered strongly into my choosing to study the three approaches introduced in this chapter—
LED has a long history in the UK, but has never become well established in the USA; GP also 
originated in the UK, but took off in the USA in the late 1990s; and RC models involve a new 
contribution by a key figure in the area of IQ and heritability, and responses are mostly yet to 
emerge.) 
A third direction would involve commentators on science and its social dynamics 
engaging in those dynamics with a view to influencing the future path of the science. Of course, 
writing commentaries is in itself a form of engagement. But it is possible to become a more 
“reflexive” agent of scientific change, to delve more self-consciously into the social dynamics 
with a view to identifying points of potential engagement for oneself and others (Scott et al. 
1990). Such points of engagement are often specific to the individual in their context and 
provisional, subject to ongoing modification in light of responses to engagement and other 
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changes in the individual's context. Nevertheless, writing about engagements that link science 
and its social dynamics may help readers to draw and explore analogies in their own situations. 
In this spirit, let me mention three modest examples from my own work in progress as a teacher 
and researcher of science in its social context. 
In a course on “biology and society” I have used the LED case on depression to move 
discussion beyond the genes-environment dichotomy. After presenting Bowlby's reconstruction 
of Brown and Harris's analysis (Figure 2.2), I add a hypothetical genetic-biochemical strand, in 
which the developing individual is more susceptible to the biochemical shifts that are associated 
with depression. Although early diagnosis and lifelong treatment with prophylatic 
antidepressants could reduce the chances of onset of severe depression, there are many other 
readily conceivable engagements, such as quick action to ensure a reliable caregiver when a 
mother dies or is hospitalized, contraceptive education for adolescents, increasing state support 
for single mothers, and so on (Taylor 1995). In a follow-up activity I have students take the idea 
of multiple points of engagement in cross-connecting strands and extend it to their own 
development as future scientists or health care professionals. They try their hand at diagramming 
the life course that brought them to attend this kind of course, and I invite them to reflect on the 
contingent intersections of outside influences and their own agency. In short, at the same time as 
I stimulate students to think about more complex causal accounts in science, I ask them to think 
more deliberately about the complex causal connections that may shape their future work in 
science. 
In my research I have begun to bring GP, LED, and RC to the attention of exponents of 
the other approaches. My plan is to note their immediate responses during interviews and to keep 
track of subsequent developments, if any, in their analyses and discussions of gene-environment 
interactions. This material should flesh out the potential challenges identified in the previous 
section at the same time as it reveals more of the dynamics of scientific change—or resistance to 
change. When I have enough material to present, I hope I can use it to stimulate more complex 
thinking, not only about the development of behavioral and medical conditions over any 
individual's lifetime, but also about multiple points of potential engagement that can affect those 
developmental processes. 
In my teaching and my writing, I try to illustrate ways that close examination of concepts 
and methods within any given natural or social science can motivate or animate interpretations 
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of the social influences on those sciences, and vice versa. In some accounts prepared for non-
specialist audiences I draw correlations between scientists' ideas and the actions that the ideas 
facilitate; that is, I interpret the science as building in the social action favored or privileged by 
the scientists (Taylor and Buttel 1992; but see Taylor 1995 for a more complex account). In this 
vein, after reflecting on some remarks made by Richard Lewontin during the course of a recent 
discussion around a brief account of RC models of IQ that I had sent him, I have begun to see 
curious commonalities between BG and CBD. Both sides, it seems, build into their analyses a 
view of social action as overarching change effected by some superintending agency. Although 
there is not space here to provide the full conceptual-social reconstruction behind this assertion, 
let me say a little more, which will allow me to return in closing to some issues raised in the 
preamble. 
Plant breeding research and its recommendations to farmers can be effective without 
knowledge of bio-physical causes involved in the pathways of plant growth and development 
and in the ways these pathways are affected by the different treatments (e.g., levels of fertilizer 
applied) studied. All that is required to cause the desired yields is control over which varieties to 
interbreed or plant and ability to replicate environmental conditions. This control/replication 
model of causes underlies the Analysis of Variance and related tools of quantitative genetics. 
Yet, the genetic and environmental control that makes this model of causes useful in agriculture 
is not possible for humans and their environments. The control/replication model, nevertheless, 
still shapes debates between BG and CBD. In CBD the conceptual point that heritability does not 
mean unchangeable is often illustrated with thought-experiments that involve well-defined 
varieties of plants all grown in the same nutrient deficient environment before they are all shifted 
to a uniform nutrient rich environment. Moreover, when CBD addresses the conservative policy 
implications drawn from heritability research, it posits intelligence-boosting environments that 
American society has not yet explored (Lewontin 1970b). Likewise, when BG searches 
(unsuccessfully) for environmental factor-X's that correlate with differences among means for 
racial groups, it also proceeds as if there could be something about American society that treats 
each racial group uniformly and differently from other groups. 
Statistical analysis can be used with other models of causes that, unlike the Analysis of 
Variance, do not assume control and replication. Significant patterns can be considered to be 
invitations to search for underlying causes, which in agriculture would mean the bio-physical 
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causes involved in the pathways of plant growth and development under various treatments. In 
research on human behavior the search for underlying causes would mean piecing together the 
bio-social pathways of growth and development of the persons in particular conditions. Because 
BG researchers and their critics cannot—except in eugenic or revolutionary scenarios—have the 
control available to agricultural researchers, the alternative causal model might yield more 
insight, not only about current observations, but about potentialities for change. 
The contrasting model is evident in LED research, to an increasing extent in GP, and 
potentially in RC. Recall the LED method: subjects are interviewed in depth to produce detailed 
case histories of life events and difficulties; the seriousness of events in the transcripts are rated 
with reference to context (but without knowledge of whether the subject became ill); and 
statistical analyses are used to identify combinations of proximate and background factors that 
distinguish ill from healthy subjects. The results are used to raise further questions and inquiry. 
For example, Brown and Harris (1978, 271) found that a supportive, confiding relationship with 
a partner had an effect in protecting a woman from developing depression after experiencing a 
severe event. They suggest, however, that the effect “might have little to do with confiding as 
such but with, say, the way she is able to think about the marriage and value it.” Suggestions of 
this kind have led to an active interplay, characteristic of LED research, between statistical 
analysis of past case histories and design of interviews and rating schemes for new situations. 
More recently, LED has included interventions, such as home visits by volunteer conversation 
partners, in their research designs (Harris 2000). 
LED and GP research suggest to me that it is possible for sociologists and biologists to 
measure and model interesting things about the complexities of bio-social development of 
human traits. To do so requires an approach that looks not for society-wide factors, but attends to 
contingency of development and its meaning in particular contexts. This suggests a lesson for 
evolutionary biology. I proposed in an qqearlier Lewontin festschrift (Taylor 2001) that “[i]n the 
center of any historical account we should see a lineage of active organisms, organisms that 
construct their responses to [dynamic ecological] situations that earlier responses in their lifetime 
and their lineage's earlier responses have helped construct.”  My chapter was critical of 
population genetic models for “compressing organism-organism and organism-environment 
relationships into the fitness conferred on an organism by its characters.”  I did not, however, 
propose replacement models or methods for investigating evolution in a dynamic ecological 
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context. I can now imagine a program applicable at least for microevolutionary research, which, 
like LED, integrates quantitative “epidemiology” and case history. To paraphrase my summary 
above: organisms could be observed in depth to produce detailed case histories of life events and 
difficulties; the events in the observations could be rated with reference to ecological context 
(but without knowledge of whether the organism survived and reproduced); and statistical 
analyses could be used to identify combinations of proximate and background factors that 
distinguish organisms that contribute to the next generation from those that did not. The results 
would be used to raise further questions and inquiry." 
Of course, it is one thing for a commentator on science to suggest that something might 
be interesting to study; it is quite another to engage in the social dynamics of a science with a 





Bridge 2: From Plant Breeding to Human Variation and Heredity 
 
My first research job in the mid-1970s was in plant breeding. Our research group sought 
to make sense of the ways that different varieties of a crop plant varied in their responses across 
a range of locations. My role was to analyze data from large trials, such as one in which 49 
wheat varieties were grown in each of 63 locations around the world. A first step in the data 
analysis was to partition the variation observed in a given trait, say, yield, into components 
related to the averages or means of the varieties (across all 63 locations), the means of the 
locations (across all 49 varieties), and so on (see Figure 3.3). (Indeed, agricultural breeding was 
where partitioning of variation and measuring heritability, which is related to the variation 
among the variety means, originated.) 
The challenge was then to use the partitioning of variation to hypothesize what it was 
about any variety that led to its pattern of response across locations and what it was about any 
location that led to the responses of any variety in that location compared to others. Knowing 
what aspects of, say, the variety’s pedigree or the environmental conditions contributed to the 
yield of that variety in that location could then inform subsequent breeding or cultivation 
decisions. Such hypothesis generation was never easy, even though we had large and complete 
data sets to work from as well as a lot of background information about the varieties and 
locations.  
Fast forward to the 2000s and the lines of inquiry sketched in Chapter 2, in particular, the 
attempt of Dickens and Flynn to reconcile large generation-to-generation advances in IQ test 
scores (the so-called Flynn effect) with the trait having high heritability. I approached their 
work—indeed, the whole arena of debates around behavioral genetics or what we might call 
heritability studies—with an understanding that hypothesizing about genetic and environmental 
factors must be even tougher when researchers partition variation for human in place of 
agricultural traits. In human studies any genetically-defined type is, at best, replicated twice—as 
identical twins—and different genetic types cannot be systematically raised across the same 
range of locations—families, socio-economic status, and so on.  
I had some reservations about the models of Dickens and Flynn, which I shared after 
interviewing them in 2004 about their work; Dickens generously spelled out his thinking in 





digging deeper into the conceptual foundations of heritability estimation and partitioning of 
variation. As I questioned what Dickens, Flynn, and others treated as unobjectionable, I was 
explicating first principles, not disputing details of specialized models, mathematics, or data sets. 
In doing so, I was making extensive use of perspectives and examples from my work in plant 
breeding.  
I understood the difficulties of translating from statistical partitioning of variation for a 
given trait to hypotheses about measurable genetic and environmental factors even in the rich 
data sets we had had from crop evaluation trials. A fortiori I understood that the statistical 
patterns are conceptually distinct from those factors. I puzzled over how to converse with 
researchers and other commentators who blurred the distinction. But I was also aware that the 
leading edge of research on variation and heredity of complex traits (e.g., height, intelligence, 
heart disease) was moving from partitioning of variation in the traits “to the detection and 
identification of variants that are associated with or directly cause variation” (Visscher et al. 
2007). Even though that move had drawn motivation from claims about the partitioning of trait 
variation, could any shortcomings I now identified in that partitioning or its interpretation gain 
attention from researchers who were now busy examining a multitude of actual genetic variants?  
As I began to puzzle over all this, my earlier plant breeding research also led me to raise 
the possibility that the genetic and environmental factors underlying a trait are heterogeneous, 
differing from one set of varieties or relatives to the next or from one location or environment to 
the next. This possibility had not been identified as a significant methodological concern by 
quantitative geneticists or by critical commentators on heritability research. The implications led 
me to a whole new project on how research in general, not only in heritability studies, addresses 
or suppresses various kinds of heterogeneity. This became the topic for a different book project 
(Taylor 2014 [SW troubled by hetero]), but the results of my puzzling over the implications of 
underlying heterogeneity for heritability studies will be evident in the chapters ahead. As will my 
puzzling over what to do when we see something significant that has been overlooked. In sum, 
the following qq chapters capture from various angles what preoccupied me in the six years after 




Three Puzzles and Eight Gaps: 
What Heritability Studies and Critical Commentaries have not Paid Enough 
Attention to 
 
It is commonplace to hear that some trait “has a strong genetic basis” or “of course 
there is a combination of genes and environment, but the hereditary component is sizeable.” 
That weighting of contributions derives from researchers partitioning the variation in the trait 
into a fraction called heritability and into other component parts. The puzzling that followed the 
exchange with Dickens about his models of the Flynn effect (see Bridge 2 above) led me to 
identify some significant overlooked issues. Yet readers, I understood, might well be skeptical of 
new criticisms given that such partitioning of so-called genetic and environmental contributions 
has been subject to decades of debate among methodologically sophisticated scholars.  
I articulated various issues in a series of articles (and some unpublished manuscripts), 
and then saw how to distill them into eight conceptual and methodological gaps that could be 
conveyed without recourse to technical formulas, data analysis, or case studies. Some of these 
gaps should be kept open; others should be bridged—or the difficulty of doing so should be 
conceded. Previous researchers and commentators have either not acknowledged all the gaps, 
not developed the appropriate responses, or not consistently sustained those responses.  
With a view to gaining the attention of readers, this chapter first introduces three 
significant puzzles that had not been resolved by past debates. The final section revisits those 
puzzles. Some technical discussion is included in boxes; most is left to the later chapters, which 
pursue, from other angles, the challenge of moving readers who remain skeptical or otherwise 
resistant in the face of this chapter’s approach to clarifying or correcting the foundations of 
heritability studies and its implications. 
   
I. Three puzzles not resolved by past debates about heritability 
 
Puzzle 3.1. The two-part argument and the IQ paradox 
Flynn (1994) has pointed to large gains in average IQ test score between generations 





education level, has been shown to be strongly associated with these generational differences. At 
the same time, according to the current consensus, heritability of IQ test scores is high (Neisser 
et al. 1996, but see Turkheimer et al. 2003, Nisbett et al. 2012). Persistent large differences in 
average IQ test score also exist between racial groups (but with recent decreases, Nisbett et al. 
2012). As with the generational differences, no environmental factor, or composite of factors, 
has been strongly associated with racial group average differences. (There has been some success 
using regression analysis to identify associations between environmental factors and differences 
between the mean test scores for racial groups; Fryer and Levitt 2004). 
Many human behavioral geneticists and psychometricians (analysts of data from 
personality and educational tests) are prepared to entertain a two-part argument: the high 
heritability of IQ test scores within racial groups coupled with a failure of environmental 
hypotheses to account for the group differences supports explanations of mean differences in 
terms of genetic factors (e.g., Jensen in Miele 2002, 111ff). (The specific factors still have to be 
elucidated, so “support” may be read as “lends plausibility to the belief that they exist.”)  By that 
logic, however, we would have to entertain explanations of generational differences in terms of 
genetic factors, but we know that the changes in gene frequencies in a human population over 
one generation are negligible. There must be a hole in the logic of the two-part argument, but 
where is it? If we were to find the hole, would that help us explain large differences between 
generations in a high heritability trait such as IQ test score? These questions constitute the IQ 






Figure 3.1. Schematic of the “Flynn effect”—large gains in average IQ test score between 
generations, marked group 1 and group 2 in this figure.  
 
Puzzle 3.2. The possibility of underlying heterogeneity 
Claims that some human trait, say, IQ test score at age 18, shows high heritability derive 
from an analysis of data from relatives. For example, the similarity of pairs of monozygotic 
twins (who share all their genes) can be compared with the similarity of pairs of dizygotic twins 
(who do not share all their genes). The more that the former similarity exceeds the latter, the 
higher the trait’s heritability. Researchers and commentators often describe such calculations as 
showing how much a trait is heritable or genetic. However, no genes or measurable genetic 
factors (such as alleles, tandem repeats, or chromosomal inversions) are examined in deriving 
heritability estimates, nor does the method of analysis suggest where to look for them. Moreover, 
even if the similarity between twins or a set of close relatives is associated with the similarity of 
yet-to-be-identified genetic factors, the factors may not be the same from one set of relatives to 







heterogeneous. It could be that pairs of alleles, say, AAbbcbDDee, subject to a sequence of 
environmental factors, say, FghiJ, are associated, all other things being equal, with the same 
outcomes as alleles aabbCCDDEE subject to a sequence of environmental factors FgHiJ (see 
Figure 3.2 for the case of human twins where both members of each pair are raised in the same 
household). If the genetic and environmental factors underlying the observed trait are 
heterogeneous, what can researchers do on the basis of a heritability estimate? What can 
researchers they do when the underlying factors are unknown and the method of data analysis 




Figure 3.2. Factors underlying a trait may be heterogeneous even when identical (monozygotic) 
twins raised together (MZT) are more similar than fraternal (dizygotic) twins raised together 
(DZT). The greater similarity is indicated here by smaller size of the curly brackets. The 
underlying factors for two MZT pairs are indicated by upper- and lowercase letters for pairs of 
alleles (A-E) and the environmental factors to which they are subject (F-J).  
 
Puzzle 3.3. The potential for confusion in translating from finding patterns in data to 





Many of the terms and concepts in the statistical analysis of trait variation arose in 
agricultural trials directed toward selective breeding or toward the manipulation of 
environmental factors that influence the development of traits of interest. In other words, 
patterns in data are translated into ideas about the factors influencing the dynamics of 
development and reproduction under selective mating. These translations create the potential for 
confusion.  
Heritability connotes a connection between parent and offspring through transmission of 
genes. However, as mentioned in Puzzle 3.2, the term’s technical meaning and statistical 
estimation involve no reference to measurable, transmissible genetic factors. The estimation does 
not even entail a connection between one generation and the next—heritability for a given trait is 
defined as a quantity that summarizes observations made of a specific set of varieties and 
locations at one point in time. (Heritability can be calculated from correlations between parents 
and offspring, but to do so requires models of theoretical, unobserved genes that determine the 
trait, and a suite of other assumptions; see Gaps 3-6 in Section II.)  
If the term heritability invites confusion, so does the related term genetic variation or 
variance (where variance is the technical way of quantifying variation). This term might seem to 
refer to variation among different individuals who possess some measurable genetic factor(s). 
However, the so-called genetic variation that is involved in the estimation of heritability is the 
variation across groups of related individuals (i.e., across varieties or genotypes) in the average 
value of the trait for each group. This distinction has been muddied by the increasing use over 
the last few years of the term heritability to refer to a conceptually and empirically distinct 
quantity that summarizes variation in measurable genetic factors. This new heritability is the 
fraction of variation in a trait associated with variation in Single-Nucleotide Polymorphisms 
(SNPs) as examined by Genome-Wide Association studies (see qqChapter qq, Items H.6 and 
I.4). 
The potential for confusion becomes even greater when researchers who are technically 
proficient in the statistical analysis of measurements on a trait interpret results in quantitative 
genetics—or what we might less formally call heritability studies—in terms of the influence of 
the (unknown) measurable genetic and environmental factors that underlie the development of 
the trait. To cite just a few examples: Heritability is defined by Layzer (1974, 1259) as the 





genetic differences.”  Plomin et al. (1997, 83) define heritability as the “contribution of genetic 
differences to observed differences among individuals.” Turkheimer (2000, 160), summarizing 
the findings of quantitative genetics about human behavioral or psychological traits, states: “The 
effect of being raised in the same family is smaller than the effect of genes.” 
 How has the potential for confusion around heritability and genetic variation played out 
over the long history of the application of statistical analyses of trait variation in agricultural 
trials and selective breeding? (Recall that this is the context in which the methods of analysis in 
heritability studies arose.) When agricultural and laboratory breeders identify a pattern in 
measurements of a specific set of individuals in a specific range of situations at one point in 
time, in what ways do they use that pattern to identify factors influencing the dynamics of 
development and reproduction under selective mating? (Indeed, one might puzzle over the 
assumptions and steps needed more generally to connect pattern to process [Theme 1.10].)  How 
much do the methods used by breeders for translating patterns in data into measurable factors 
depend on the agricultural or laboratory context in which varieties and locations (often labeled 
genotypes and environments) can be deliberately chosen and replicated? What does this say 
about the interpretation of statistical analyses of human variation, where control and replication 
are difficult? 
 
II. Eight gaps in analyzing and interpreting heritability 
 
To gain insight into the three puzzles in Section I, we should acknowledge and make 
appropriate responses to the eight conceptual and methodological gaps in heritability studies. 
Most researchers and commentators have not acknowledged or not appropriately responded to 
all of these. They are listed in Table 3.1, then introduced in sequence. 
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between groups within groups does not 
translate to explanation of 
differences among 
groups. 
gap is firm and its 
implications are deep. 
 
 
Gap 1. Key terms have multiple meanings that are distinct 
Key terms have multiple meanings that are distinct and should not be conflated; in other 
words, this first gap needs to be kept open. Terminological changes can reduce the potential for 
confusion. 
  
Consider, especially, the term genetic. Two different meanings of the term were 
identified in Puzzle 3.3. To these we can add the common use of the term to mean inherited or to 
mean something that recurs in a family. To reduce the potential for confusion, the term genetic 
will be used here as an adjective and will refer to entities or factors that are transmitted through 
the germline from parents to offspring and whose presence or absence can, in principle, be 
observed. Similarly, environmental is used exclusively to refer to measurable factors.  
Additional terminological steps that can be taken to reduce potential confusion include 
avoiding the term phenotype to refer to traits and genotype and environment to refer to groups of 
identical or related individuals and the locations or situations in which they are raised or grown. 
Those terms are prone to obscure the fact that analysis of variation in traits neither requires 
knowledge nor, on its own, produces knowledge about the genetic or environmental factors that 
influence the development of the individual’s trait (phenotype) in the circumstances in which it 
is raised (see Gap 2). The agricultural terms variety and location are suitably neutral 
replacements for the terms genotype and environment. A variety is a group of individuals whose 
relatedness by genealogy can be characterized, such as the offspring of a given pair of parents, or 
a group of individuals whose mix of genetic factors can be replicated, as in an open-pollinated 
plant variety or pure (genetically identical) lines. A location is the situation or place in which the 
variety is raised, such as a family (for humans) or a specific experimental research station (for 
agricultural varieties). (Locations in agricultural and laboratory research are sometimes defined 
by the level of a specific environmental factor, such as the temperature at which a fruit fly is 
raised or the manure applied to fertilize potatoes, but the term is used in this book without 
assuming that is necessarily the case.) 





analysis of genes or genetic factors, but the analysis of continuous variation in traits of humans, 
other animals, or plants in ways that take account of the genealogical relatedness of the varieties 
whose traits are observed. (See qqItems H and I for a discussion of quantitative methods that 
have begun to employ information about genetic factors.)  However, for want of a recognizable 
alternative, the term quantitative genetics will be preserved in this book, as will heritability. (As 
noted in Bridge 2, as a non-technical synonym for aspects of quantitative genetics, heritability 
studies is also used.)  We should, however, stay mindful that using these terms risks perpetuating 
misleading connotations (see Puzzles 3.2 and 3.3). The potential for confusion is reduced, but 
not eliminated, by acknowledging the next gap.  
 
Gap 2. Statistical patterns are distinct from measurable underlying factors  
Estimates of heritability derive from statistical analysis of variation in traits among 
related and unrelated individuals. They do not reference measurable genetic or environmental 
factors involved in the development of those traits. It follows that any estimates or patterns 
detected by the analysis, such as the size of heritability relative to other fractions of the overall 
variation, must also be distinct from those factors. The gap between statistical patterns and 
measurable underlying factors needs to be recognized and, as with Gap 1, kept open. 
 
The point is not new, but even critical commentators often fail to maintain the distinction (see 
Gap 1 and qqItem H). To demonstrate the distinction and, at the same time, make the meaning of 
heritability clear, consider the simplest case, which is an agricultural evaluation trial of a set of 
varieties raised in each of set of locations, and where there are two or more replicates in each 
variety-location combination (Figure 3.3). The total variation among replicates for any observed 
trait, such as crop yield per unit area, can be divided into four components: the variation among 
the variety means (vA, vB, etc.), the variation among the location means (l1, l2, etc.), the variation 
among means for variety-location combinations after subtracting the variety and location means 
for each combination (not depicted in Figure 3.3), and the variation among replicates within 
variety-location combinations (indicated by the curly brackets). (This partitioning of variation is 
called the Analysis of Variance or ANOVA.) Heritability for the trait is, by definition, simply 
the first of the four components—variation among the variety means—expressed as a fraction of 






Figure 3.3. Partitioning of variation for a given trait in the ideal agricultural evaluation trial 
where each of a set of varieties is raised in each of a set of locations, and there are two or more 
replicates in each variety-location combination. The variation between replicates within variety-
location combinations is indicated by the size of the curly brackets. The non-systematic shading 
of the brackets indicates that the variation between replicates is not correlated from one variety-
location combination to another. (The agricultural evaluation trial contrasts with Figure 3.2 in 
which the replicates of any one variety—twin pairs—are raised in only one location—
household—per variety.) 
 
In the spirit of spelling out the various connections between concept, method, and 
application related to each gap, let us review several questionable ideas and practices that 






a.  The components of variation are given shorthand names—variety variance, location 
variance, variety-location interaction variance, and error variance. (Variance, again, quantifies 
variation. The variety variance, for example, assesses the size of the deviations of the variety 
means from the overall mean for the trait by averaging the square of those deviations.) 
Heritability becomes the ratio of the variety (or “genetic”) variance to the total variance, which 
can be re-expressed ambiguously as the “proportion… that is attributable to genetic variation 
among individuals” (Wikipedia n.d., a). That formulation can lead to statements that obscure the 
distinction altogether, such as those noted in the Introduction and Puzzle 3.3. Here is another 
example: “Heritability analyses estimate the relative contributions of differences in genetic and 
non-genetic factors to the total phenotypic [i.e., trait] variance in a population” (Wikipedia n.d., 
a). Similarly, the distinction is obscured when location (or “shared environmental”) variance gets 
interpreted as a measure of the effect of experiences or environmental factors shared by 
replicates in a variety-location combination (e.g., the members of a family growing up together; 
see Item qqH.3). 
b.  When estimating heritability from datasets in which varieties have varying degrees of 
genealogical relatedness (e.g., identical or monozygotic twins versus fraternal or dizygotic 
twins), models often refer to theoretical genes that each add a small contribution to the trait. 
However, analyses built around these models are of observations of traits, so there must always 
be alternative formulations making no reference to genes (Chapters 5 and 6; see also Gaps 4 and 
5). 
 
Box 3.1. Heritability defined and estimated 
Heritability is the variance among the variety means expressed as a fraction of the total 
variance for a trait as observed for individuals raised in a given set of variety-location 
combinations. Strictly, this defines across-location heritability. An alternative, within-location 
heritability, is relevant where researchers expect that the variety will continue to be raised in the 
same location. In effect, this quantity takes the heritability estimated in each location separately 
and averages these estimates over all locations. This method of estimation does not take into 
account differences between the averages for the trait from one location to the next. Across-





relevant when the varieties could be raised or grown again in any of the original set of locations. 
Strictly, variation among the variety means defines heritability in the broad sense. Narrow-
sense heritability, which is used to predict change under selective breeding, is defined in a way 
that depends on assumptions about the action of theoretical idealized genes in the standard 
models of quantitative genetics (see Chapter 4 qqE.4.1.b). 
Heritability can also be estimated through path analysis, a data analysis technique that 
quantifies the relative contributions (path coefficients) of variables to the variation in a focal 
variable once a certain network of interrelated variables has been accepted (Lynch & Walsh 
1998, 823). (Variable here may refer to measurable factors or to quantities [so-called effects] 
defined by an Analysis of Variance [see qqChapterqqItem F.5].) The reliability of the estimates 
depends on the assumptions built into the networks, such as the similarity of relatives of 
different degrees and the inclusion or exclusion of coefficients for variety-location interaction 
(see Gap 5 and Item qqChapterqqF.5). When the Analysis of Variance and path analysis use the 
same assumptions, they estimate the same quantities, including heritability. 
Recently, heritability has been used to refer to the fraction of variation for a trait accounted 
for by genomic variants identified in Genome Wide Association studies (Manolio et al. 2009). 
When this quantity is mentioned in this book, the label new heritability will be used to mark that 






Figure 3.4. Partitioning of variation related to hypothetical genetic and environmental gradients. 
The arbitrary order of varieties and locations in Figure 3.3 has been replaced by a specific order 
along these gradients given by the relative size of, respectively, the variety means and the 
location means. See text for an argument against assuming such gradients exist. 
 
c.  A gradient of a measurable genetic factor (or composite of factors) is assumed to run 
through the differences among variety means (Figure 3.4 and Box 3.2). To see that this 
assumption is not necessary, note that the analyses in heritability studies do not require the 
varieties to be from the same species or even the same taxonomic class. If the varieties were not, 
we would not assume such a genetic gradient exists. Yet, there is nothing in the method of data 
analysis that changes from a multi-species situation to one in which the varieties are drawn from 
a single species or even to one in which varieties are inbred lines. There is no point in such a 





in agricultural and laboratory research where a location is defined in terms of a specific 
environmental factor, there are no grounds to assume that a gradient of environmental factors 
runs through differences among location means. 
 
Box 3.2 Notation and hypothetical gradients  
The existence of gradients in genetic and environmental factors underlying the variation in 
traits is suggested by the symbols often used in equations,  e.g., P = G + E, where P is used to 
denote the measurement of the trait (or phenotype), G a contribution from the variety (or 
genotype), and E is a contribution from the location (or environment or environment plus error). 
Such contributions are estimated, however, using statistical methods, such as ANOVA and path 
analysis, that partition the variation in traits across some specific set of varieties and locations 
into components without reference to data about underlying genetic and environmental gradients. 
 
d.  The conditionality of patterns derived from statistical analyses of traits is discounted. 
Conditionality means that, with a different set of varieties and locations in the data, a different 
partitioning of variation results. Granted, a variety mean does serve as the single value of the 
trait for each variety that best conveys its average difference from other varieties (see Figure 
3.3). This might appear to make the assumption in c. plausible. However, the variety mean is an 
average calculated over a particular range of locations in which varieties are observed, so the 
variety mean is not simply a property of the variety. Conditionality likewise applies to location 
means. 
e.  Heritability is given causal significance without identifying the measurable genetic and 
environmental factors that underlie it. In the broad sense of causes as differences that make a 
difference, a difference among the observed trait for individuals from two varieties can be 
associated with a difference between two variety means. Heritability has causal significance in 
that sense given that it quantifies the average of the variety-mean differences (squaring them so 
the direction of the difference becomes unimportant). Similarly, differences between location 
means can be thought of as causes. However, the insight that can be drawn from assessing how 
much traits are caused in this sense is limited. Because the variety and location means are 
conditional on the particular sets of varieties and locations, this difference-between-means form 





any rerun is the noise (i.e., unsystematic, residual, or error variation in an ANOVA). (This point 
is developed in Item F). 
f.  Replicability of varieties and locations is imagined for human traits (see Item F.4 for 
discussion).  
g.  The idea of genotype-environment correlation (or gene-environment correlation), which 
has a well-defined technical meaning in quantitative genetics (Jacquard 1983; Lynch and Walsh 
1998, 47), is used in more colloquial discussions that assume that genes can elicit particular 
environmental factors or vice versa (Plomin et al. 1977, Scarr and McCartney 1983, Sesardic 
2005) (see qqItem H.2 for discussion). 
 
If we do not adopt the preceding ideas and practices, but instead highlight the gap between 
statistical patterns in traits and underlying measurable factors, we might ask how the gap can be 
bridged. This question leads to the third gap. 
  
Gap 3. Translation from statistical analyses to hypotheses about measurable factors is 
difficult 
It is difficult to translate from statistical analyses of data on traits to hypotheses about 
the measurable genetic or environmental factors that influence the development of the traits. The 
steps and conditions needed to bridge this gap—or to circumvent it—warrant attention. 
 
Consider three paths that researchers might pursue: 
a.  Undertake research to identify the specific, measurable genetic and environmental factors 
without reference to the trait’s heritability or the other fractions of the total variance (e.g., 
Moffitt et al. 2005, Davey Smith and Ebrahim 2007, Khoury et al. 2007). Discussion of this 
direction of research takes us beyond heritability studies (see qqItem I). 
b.  Use high heritability as an indicator that “the trait [is] a potentially worthwhile candidate 
for molecular research” that would identify the specific genetic factors involved (Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics 2002, chap. 11; emphasis mine). This path assumes that a gradient of a 
measurable genetic factor (or composite of factors) runs through the differences among variety 
means (contra Gap 2, point c., above). There may well be certain traits for which such a gradient 





conducting fruitless investigations of other heritable traits for which it turns out there is no such 
gradient. (This search for the traits with a genetic gradient is not a search for traits that are 
largely determined by genes at a single locus, whose effect is more or less independent of the 
individuals’ upbringing. [Presence of extra digits or polydactyly would be such a trait.] Such 
high penetrance major genes can be detected through examination of family trees; heritability 
analysis need not be involved.) In pursuing molecular research guided by heritability estimates, 
there is a risk that the proportion of fruitful investigations will be low compared to investigations 
confounded by the lack of an underlying gradient. In any case, additional knowledge beyond that 
derived from the statistical analysis is always required. 
c.  Restrict attention to variation within a set of relatives. Even if the underlying factors are 
not yet known, high heritability still means that if one twin develops a trait (e.g., type 1 
diabetes), the other twin is more likely to as well. This information might stimulate the second 
twin to take measures to reduce the health impact if and when the disease starts to appear. 
However, notice that this path assumes that the timing of getting the condition differs from the 
first twin to the second. Researchers might well then ask: What factors influence the timing? 
How changeable are these? How much reduction in risk comes from changing them? To address 
these issues researchers would have to identify the genetic and environmental factors that 
influence the development of the trait. To do so would require larger sample sizes than any 
single set of relatives allows. The question then arises whether the initial results would carry 
over from one set of relatives to others. This issue is an empirical one; there is a risk, as before, 
that the proportion of fruitful investigations will be low compared to those confounded by 
factors not carrying over well from the initial set of relatives. 
 It should be noted that path b. seems to rest on an intuition that high heritability indicates 
that measurable genetic factors have more influence on variation in the trait than measurable 
environmental factors (even though the specific factors are unknown); similarly for the ratio of 
variation among location means (or shared environmental effects) and other fractions of variance 
(Turkheimer 2000). However, this intuition is unreliable. It lacks support, even in the ideal case 
of agricultural evaluation trials. To gather such support would require, in the absence of prior 
knowledge of how genetic and environmental factors influence the development of the trait, a 
program of theoretical exploration consisting of several steps (which have not, to my knowledge, 





assumptions on which the models are built; calculate heritability for a representative range of 
values of each model's parameters; and discover associations between the heritability 
calculations and the corresponding genetic and environmental factors that are robust across 
models (Taylor 2006a). 
 Now, to speak of considering a range of models is to imply that alternatives exist to the 
standard models presented in quantitative genetic texts, models that center on theoretical genes. 
Chapter qq elaborates on the standard models and alternatives, including models free of 
references to theoretical genetic and environmental factors. For now, let us note that employing 
models of theoretical genes and giving advice to relatives are examples of trying to circumvent 
Gap 3. There are alternative actions that can be taken in the absence of knowledge of underlying 
factors; these are discussed in the next gap.  
 
Gap 4. Predictions based on extrapolations from existing patterns of variation may not 
match outcomes 
It is possible, even without knowledge of the underlying measurable factors that are 
reproductively transmitted and influence the development of the trait, to extrapolate from 
existing patterns of variation (as captured, for example, by heritability estimates). However, we 
can expect that this extrapolation imperfectly predicts the actual outcomes. If any actions 
depend on such predictions, we need to be able to compensate for the discrepancies between 
predictions and outcomes. 
  
If we do not have knowledge of the measurable underlying factors we can focus on 
heritability as a fraction of the variation among measurements. This approach is evident in 
agricultural and laboratory breeding, where selection of parents of the next generation can 
proceed on the basis of observed traits and without knowledge of the underlying factors. High 
(or low) heritability is used to indicate whether (or not) to expect selective breeding to produce 
the desired improvement in the average value of the trait across the population. (Selective 
breeding is, of course, not an acceptable option for humans.) Moreover, simple models of 
multiple, theoretical genes underlying the traits (Item E.1) allow breeders to make more refined 
predictions of the advance under different breeding plans (e.g., mating of half-siblings versus 





Because heritability is a summary of observations made at one point in time for a 
specified set of varieties and locations (Gap 2, point d.), we would expect it to be an imperfect 
predictor of advances from one generation to the next under selection (which changes the mix of 
varieties) and under breeding (which produces new genetic combinations). However, in 
agricultural and laboratory settings, researchers are able to replicate varieties and locations (see 
Gap 2, point f.) and they can select among varieties for the next generation on the assumption 
that the environmental factors will remain more or less unchanged. Because the researchers have 
such control, the predictions can be made with more confidence. In any case, if the actual 
advance under selective breeding is less than predicted, breeders can always compensate for 
discrepancies—they discard the undesired offspring, breed the desired ones, and continue.  
Control of situations is, like selective breeding, neither acceptable nor achievable for 
humans. Nevertheless, when models of genes (albeit theoretical ones) are fitted to the observed 
variation in the trait, the models appear to show the relative degree of influence of genetic and 
other factors on the trait, even if the identity of those factors remains unknown. (In other words, 
Gaps 1 and 2—Terminology and Patterns versus factors—seem not to matter, and the intuition 
behind the two directions under Gap 3—Translation to hypotheses—seems to be justified.) By 
extension, high heritability leads us to expect only small changes following shifts in 
environmental factors. This last idea would seem to apply to humans as well, which would mean 
that implications could be drawn from patterns in variation even outside the realm of selective 
breeding.  
The problem with expectations based on models of theoretical genes is that, in the 
absence of evidence for the model’s assumptions and without comparing a range of alternative 
models (see discussion in Gap 3), the reliability of the predictions is uncertain, as are any claims 
about the relative degree of influence. This means, in short, that it is not so easy to sidestep the 
difficulty of translating from statistical analyses of data on traits to hypotheses about the 
measurable genetic or environmental factors that influence the development of the traits (Gap 3). 






Gap 5. The partitioning of variation, especially in human studies, does not reliably estimate 
the intended quantities  
The conventional estimation of heritability (and of other fractions of the trait’s variation) 
is not reliable because it depends on certain fundamental assumptions. The results and 
interpretation can change profoundly if plausible alternative assumptions are chosen. To remedy 
the gap between the actual estimation and reliable results requires data sets that are difficult to 
collect. 
 
The fundamental assumptions are listed in Box B.3 and elaborated in qqItem E. It should 
be noted that this gap goes beyond Gaps 3 and 4—Translation to hypotheses and Predictions—
which imply that for humans, where selective breeding and control of situations are not 
acceptable or achievable, high heritability for a trait is relevant only to restrict attention to 
variation within a set of relatives (path c. in Gap 3) or as a possible indicator that the trait is a 
candidate for molecular research, where its relevance rests on an intuition that is difficult to 
justify about the relative degree of influence by genetic and environmental factors (path b. in 
Gap 3). 
 
Box 3.3 Assumptions in standard quantitative genetic analysis 
These assumptions include the following:  
a. The analysis requires models of genes with simple Mendelian inheritance and direct 
contributions to the trait.  
b. All other things being equal, similarity in traits for relatives is proportional to the fraction 
shared by the relatives of all the genes that vary in the population. (In studies of human twins, 
fraternal or dizygotic twins are assumed to be half as similar, all other things being equal, as 
identical or monozygotic twins.)  
c. Variance among variety-location-combination means (the so-called genotype-
environment-interaction variance) can be discounted in human studies or can be incorporated 
into the heritability estimates.  
d. Residual variance in human studies is a within-family environmental contribution (the 
so-called non-shared environmental effects).  





(yet-to-be-identified and measured) genes or genetic factors, those factors are the same from one 
set of relatives to the next.  
If we do not make the last assumption in Box B.3 (which had been introduced in Puzzle 
3.2), we are led to the next gap.  
 
Gap 6. Translation from statistical analyses to hypotheses about the measurable factors is 
even more difficult in light of the possible heterogeneity of underlying genetic or 
environmental factors. 
Even when similarity within a set of close relatives (such as twin pairs) is associated with 
similarity of (yet-to-be-identified and measured) genetic or environmental factors underlying the 
development of the trait, it is possible that those factors are not the same from one set of 
relatives to the next. If the genetic and environmental factors underlying the observed trait could 
be heterogeneous, it is even more difficult to translate from statistical analyses of data on traits 
to hypotheses about the measurable genetic or environmental factors that influence the 
development of the traits. The steps and conditions needed to bridge this gap—or to circumvent 
it—warrant attention. 
 
(This gap was noted in Puzzle 3.2; it runs counter to assumption e. in Box B.3 above. On 
visualizing underlying heterogeneity, see Figure 3.2 and qqItem G.0. For further discussion, see 
qqItems G, I, and J.) 
Researchers might try to bridge or circumvent the knowledge that underlying factors may 
be heterogeneous by choosing one of the following six paths. (Difficulties in translation to 
hypotheses and in making predictions, over and above those discussed in Gaps 3 and 4—and 
more serious than those difficulties—are evident in these paths.) The first four paths parallel 
those in Gaps 3 and 4: 
a. Undertake research to identify the specific, measurable genetic and environmental 
factors without reference to the trait’s heritability or the other fractions of the total variance. 
Discussion of this research direction takes us beyond heritability studies, as was noted already in 
Gap 3. Yet, as will be discussed in qqPart III, how to pay attention to the possibility of 
heterogeneity is a challenge for research on heredity and for the human sciences more generally. 





molecular research to identify the specific genetic factors involved. There may be traits for 
which the underlying factors are not heterogeneous. These traits and factors might be worth 
finding even if researchers do not know in advance what proportion of investigations will be 
fruitful and what proportion will be confounded by the underlying heterogeneity. Again, the 
search is not for high-penetrance major genes. Researchers would be looking for traits in which 
many underlying genetic factors, each of small influence, turned out to be similar for all 
individuals within some defined population who show the same value for the trait. 
c. Restrict attention to within a set of relatives. The same logic described in Gap 3, path c 
reveals that the differential timing of getting the condition becomes an issue. Again, researchers 
have to identify the genetic and environmental factors that influence the development of the trait 
and to employ larger sample sizes than any single set of relatives. The question of what to do 
about the possibility of underlying heterogeneity of these factors thus persists. 
d. Put aside the search for measurable factors. Instead, focus on heritability as a fraction of 
the variation among measurements, a focus that makes sense in agricultural and laboratory 
breeding. If the actual advance under selective breeding is less than predicted, one source of the 
discrepancy might be the underlying heterogeneity of genetic factors and their reassortment 
through mating. Again, this matters little because breeders can always compensate for 
discrepancies: they discard the undesired offspring, breed the desired ones, and continue. 
Selective breeding is not an acceptable option for humans, so heritability as a fraction of 
variation is only useful under the interpretation that genetic factors have a larger influence than 
environmental factors for high heritability traits. As discussed in Gap 3, support for such an 
interpretation is lacking; the theoretical exploration required would be all the more challenging if 
we considered models that allow for heterogeneous factors that underlie the trait.  
 Researchers can also address the possibility of underlying heterogeneity in two ways that 
are not discussed under Gaps 3 and 4: 
e.  Reduce the possibility of underlying heterogeneity by restricting the range of varieties 
or locations. Agricultural researchers can restrict the range of locations in which a variety is 
raised or grown. They can also control environmental conditions, such as (for animals) the 
regimes of feeding and husbandry or (for plants) the application of fertilizer and irrigated water. 
Agricultural breeders can often produce inbred lines and thereby eliminate the heterogeneity of 





basis of research conducted under restrictive conditions is to presume that the restrictive 
conditions can be replicated. This presumption is most apparent when plant breeders recommend 
varieties that are to be grown only in defined regions and under prescribed techniques of 
cultivation, or when animal breeders specify the optimal feeding and husbandry for each variety. 
In the study of human traits, however, it is not feasible to control the full range of relevant 
environmental conditions or to breed for genetic uniformity. There may, nevertheless, be some 
ways to restrict the locations included in a human study (e.g., to include only families of low 
socioeconomic status; Turkheimer et al. 2003). The heritability estimates would be reliable 
(again perhaps after correction; see Gap 5) to the extent that these restrictions were replicated in 
subsequent research or policy. With restrictions replicated, the research could be applied even 
though the environmental factors underlying those locations had not been identified.  
f.  Reduce the possibility of underlying heterogeneity by grouping varieties that have 
similar responses across locations (see qqItem G.2 for discussion). This is not a feasible 
direction by which research on human variation can bridge or circumvent Gap 6. After all, when 
analyzing measurements from human twins, there are only two replicates (twins) in one or at 
most two locations (families).  
 
Gap 7. Many steps lie between the analysis of observed traits and the creation of interventions 
based on well-founded claims about the causal influence of genetic or environmental factors  
At each of the steps that make up this gap, conditions and assumptions apply that render 
the value of estimates of heritability and other fractions of the variation even more limited than 
has been discussed thus far. 
  
Suppose that hypotheses have been derived about measurable factors (even though, as 
Gaps 3–6 suggest is the case for human traits, statistical analyses such as ANOVA provide little 
guidance). The next step for researchers is to investigate associations of the trait with measurable 
factors, which can mean either using regression analysis and related statistical techniques or 
conducting experimental trials. In both cases, conditionality (Gap 2, point d.) applies, now also 
extended to conditionality on the set of factors measured. Moreover, when researchers choose 
significant factors from a statistical analysis to be manipulated in experimental trials, they are 





which the factors had been associated with the observed traits. (Manipulations or interventions 
that preserve the same dynamics seem more plausible for agricultural and laboratory trials than 
for human social relations; see Freedman 2005 and further discussion in qqItem I.3). Insights 
from these experimental studies can, in turn, contribute to research on the ways that pathways of 
growth and development are influenced by the genetic makeup of varieties and the 
environmental factors in the locations. Such research might, in turn, provide a basis for 
interventions outside the typically well-controlled conditions in which research on causes in 
growth and development is undertaken. The sequence of steps in this paragraph is summarized in 
Table 3.2qq. 
 
Table 3.2. Connections from one kind of data analysis to the next 
 
Kind of data to be 
analyzed 
Agricultural evaluation trials 
(varieties each replicated over a 
number of locations) 
Human studies of twins and 
other relatives 
Observations of a trait 
that differs across 
different varieties and 
locations 
ANOVA + cluster analysis + 
knowledge from sources outside 
data 
      
ANOVA (& path analysis) not 
helpful in generating 




Hypotheses about measurable 
factors 
(Hypotheses about factors 
drawn from other sources) 
Observed associations 
with measurable factors 
Factors significant according to 
regression analysis  
              
Factors significant according to 
regression analysis  




Factors for testing through 
experimental trials 
Factors for testing in 
experimental trialsb 
Experiments that vary 
measurable factors 
 
Significant factors               
 
Insights for investigating 








Factors observed over 
the course of 
development (rarely-
realized ideal) 
Significant factors in devel-
opment under controlled research 
conditions  
              
Candidates for interventions in 






a. The solid line underneath denotes the disconnect between the data analysis and the generation 
of hypotheses about measurable factors. 
b. The manipulation of factors without modifying the structure of dynamics is more questionable 
for humans than for agricultural species.  
 
Gap 8. Explanation of variation within groups does not translate to explanation of differences 
between groups  
 Accounting for within-group variation does not explain between-group differences. This 
is widely acknowledged, but, in the contentious debates about differences in the averages for 
racial and other groups, high heritability is seen by some to confer plausibility to hypotheses 
about the role of genetic factors in explaining those differences (see Puzzle 3.1). The gap 
between within-group and between-group differences is, however, firm and its implications are 
deep. 
 
 The following considerations counter the plausibility of hypotheses that invoke genetic 
factors to explain between-group differences (Jensen in Miele 2002, 111ff, Sesardic 2005): 
a.  Statistical analysis of variation among traits, which includes heritability estimation, 
provides little or no guidance in hypothesizing about measurable factors behind observations of 
human traits within one group of varieties (Gaps 3-6), so it can provide little or no guidance 
about measurable factors associated with differences between two groups. This point alone 
discounts the relevance of heritability to discussions of group differences (Taylor 2006b). 
Referring back to Puzzle 3.1, the two-part argument about IQ test scores changes form and loses 
its bite: There may be no measurable environmental factor associated strongly with the group or 
generational average differences, but there is no such genetic factor either. (Associations have 





mark degree of African ancestry; see summary in Nisbett 1998, 89–90.)   The average group or 
generational differences still need explanation, but high heritability—if it is truly high (see Gap 
5—Unreliable estimates)—poses no paradox.  
b.  For agricultural evaluation trials in which the observations of the trait are used to cluster 
varieties by similar responses across locations (Gap 6, path f; discussed in Item G), the 
possibility of underlying heterogeneity is minimized. 
This in turn allows researchers to hypothesize about the group averages, that is, about what 
factors in the locations elicited basically the same response from varieties in a particular variety 
group, responses that distinguish one group from another. However, if varieties are grouped by 
some criterion other than similarity of responses across locations, the possibility that 
heterogeneity of underlying factors is present can no longer be discounted when we want to 
translate from patterns in the data to hypotheses (Gap 6). In this situation the relationship 
between factors and patterns in data that underlies any hypothesizing may be difficult to 
disentangle (discussed in Item G).  
c.   Lindman’s (1992) textbook illustrates a cautionary note about nested ANOVA (i.e., when 
each variety is replicated in one location only), using high school students’ test scores in algebra 
viewed in relation to their teacher and school as an example. The students within a school are 
randomly assigned to a teacher in that school. Lindman notes that a significant difference 
between the means for the locations (schools) “is likely to be interpreted as due to differences in 
physical facilities, administration, and other factors that are independent of the teaching abilities 
of the teachers themselves… [However, d]ifferences between teachers in different schools are 
part of the [average location or school difference], and the observed differences between schools 
could be due entirely to the fact that some schools have better teachers [or] some schools have 
smarter children attending them” (Lindman 1992, 194). 
 Lindman could have added that the observed differences between schools could be due to 
any combination of factors, such as students respond worse to teachers whose attention is 
distracted because their school’s administrators insist more on detailed documentation of student 
performance. Nested ANOVA cannot help researchers hypothesize about the difference in the 
average scores from one school to the next when the teachers are replicated (in their students’ 
test scores) only within schools. To apply this to the concerns of this gap, nested ANOVA cannot 





subset of locations) to the next when the varieties are replicated only within locations (or subsets 
of locations). Researchers might just as well conduct a separate ANOVA for each subset of 
varieties and locations—or, in the context of racial differences, for each racial group and the 
experience that members have of being in that racial group. (To respect this methodological 
limitation of nested data analysis is not to make the claim that disjunct kinds of causes must be 
operating in the different racial groups.)  
d.   Another consideration relevant to the within-group versus between-group gap is the 
relationship between lack of attention to the possibility of heterogeneity of underlying factors 
(see Gap 6) and a typological or essentialist worldview that “conceptualizes diversity as 
‘deviation’ from a natural state or path of change” (McLaughlin 1998, 25). Notice that Lindman, 
even as he performs the valuable role of cautioning readers about nested analyses, perpetuates 
the typological worldview as he writes about “the observed differences between schools” when 
referring to the observed differences between averages for schools. It is still commonplace to 
hear typological expressions of the kind “men are taller than women,” “men tend to be taller than 
women,” or “men are, on average, taller than women.” Some might dispute the label typological, 
saying that the implicit variation is understood. They might see little to be gained by wordier 
statements that make the variation explicit, such as, “the variation among men’s heights centers 
at a point that is greater than the center of the variation among women’s heights,” or “the 
variation among men’s heights and the variation among women’s heights overlap, but some of 
the men’s variation lies to the right of the women’s variation and some of the women’s lies to 
the left of the men’s.” However, can we be sure that it is simply linguistic convenience to use 
simple expressions that put group or class membership first and deviation as implicit or 
secondary? If not, the wordier, non-typological alternatives help keep in view the possibility that 
the factors underlying the pattern in the data could vary among men and women and need not 
include factors solely possessed by one sex or the other (see qqItem G.0 for further discussion). 
The wordier alternatives are more likely to steer us away from thinking that there is something 
essential in each group that leads to differences in averages from one group to the next. The 
wordier alternatives might even lead us to ask just who is empowered to do something as a result 
of an analysis of differences in group averages (or who is given license not to have to do 
anything)? These larger sociological questions are among the questions raised when the qqnext 






III. Resolving some puzzles and raising others 
 
The three puzzles in Sect. I can now be revisited (albeit in reverse order). Each is 
presented in a new light and points to several new puzzles that invite attention from analysts of 
variation in quantitative genetics and social science. 
 
Puzzle 3.3 revisited: The potential for confusion in translating from finding patterns in 
data to selective breeding and the manipulation of underlying factors 
The eight conceptual-methodological gaps laid out in Sect. II, taken together, mean that 
the classical methods of quantitative genetics provide very little that is reliable and useful 
regarding the genetic and environmental factors that underlie traits, especially human behaviors 
and other traits. To recapitulate: Even in agricultural and laboratory breeding, where varieties 
and locations (often called genotypes and environments) can be controlled and replicated, the 
translation from statistical analyses to hypotheses about measurable factors is difficult. The 
translation is easier to achieve when the range of varieties or locations is restricted or when 
varieties that are similar in responses across locations are grouped (Gap 6, paths e. and f; see also 
qqItem G.2), but even then, knowledge from sources other than the data analysis is needed to 
help researchers generate hypotheses. Hypotheses, in turn, are only one step toward interventions 
based on well-founded claims about the causal influence of genetic or environmental factors (see 
Gap 7). 
The difficulty of exposing the genetic and environmental factors that underlie traits can 
be circumvented by agricultural and laboratory breeders. Suppose they use the standard 
quantitative genetic models, which refer to theoretical genes that each make a small contribution 
to the trait, to predict advances under selective breeding. Then, even if the assumptions behind 
the models are impossible to verify or are unreliable (see Gaps 3–5 and Chapter 6), the breeders 
can compensate for discrepancies: discard the undesired offspring, breed the desired ones, and 
continue. This option is unavailable to researchers studying human variation. 
In short, the most important insight from Puzzle 3.3 is that the methods of quantitative 
genetics do not translate well from agricultural and laboratory breeding to statistical analyses of 





philosophers of biology. Given that human heritability estimation is based on data that are less 
ideal than agricultural evaluation trials, how has it been envisioned that human estimates could 
support claims about more general notions of genetic or environmental causality? How were 
restrictive conditions—the control and replicability that can be achieved in agricultural and 
laboratory breeding—discounted or forgotten when methods of heritability estimation were 
adapted to human genetics? (see qqItem F.6) 
 
Puzzle 3.2 revisited: The possibility of underlying heterogeneity 
The recapitulation of Sect. II in the first two paragraphs above also speaks to Puzzle 3.2, 
which concerns what researchers can do without knowing if the genetic or environmental factors 
that underlie traits are heterogeneous. In agricultural and laboratory trials, researchers can pursue 
approaches that make that possibility less disturbing—they have the ability to replicate varieties 
and locations, to control the variability in those varieties and locations, to reduce heterogeneity 
through grouping varieties by similarity of responses across locations, and to compensate for 
shortcomings in predictions of advances under selective breeding. In human studies, however, 
high heritability may be used primarily as a guide to decide whether to pursue molecular 
research to identify the specific genetic factors involved for the trait (Gap 6, path a.) or whether 
not to search for environmental influences or promote social policies based on them. Yet, using 
heritability to guide molecular or social research is likely to be fruitful only if three questionable 
conditions apply: the heritability is truly high (but see Gap 5), a gradient of a measurable genetic 
factor (or composite of factors) runs through the differences among variety means (but see Gap 
2, point c.), and the underlying factors are not heterogeneous (but see Gap 6). 
When the preceding conditions cannot be assured, it would be prudent for researchers not 
to place too much stock in heritability as a guide, let alone rely on the misleading intuition about 
a genetic gradient that may underlie variation among variety means (see Gaps 2, point c. and 
Gap 3). Instead, researchers could explore methods that attempt to identify the specific, 
measurable genetic and environmental factors without reference to the trait’s heritability or the 
other fractions of the total variance (i.e., path a. under Gaps 3 and 6; see also Item I). This said, 
genomic studies have had very limited success identifying causally relevant genetic variants 
behind variation in human traits (McCarthy et al. 2008, Couzin-Frankel 2010), a result that is not 





researchers have responded to the difficulties by emphasizing genetic heterogeneity (McClellan 
and King 2010). However, the challenge that researchers face identifying causally relevant 
factors is even greater because underlying heterogeneity encompasses environmental as well as 
genetic factors.  
If the answer to Puzzle 3.2 is that only in circumscribed situations can researchers do 
anything reliable when they do not know whether or not the genetic or environmental factors that 
underlie traits are heterogeneous, a number of follow-up issues arise. First, it would be 
interesting to revisit studies that interpret heritability and so-called genetic variance as measuring 
the contribution of the genetic factors to the process through which the trait develops. What can 
be learned from the data and analyses in such studies once we highlight the gap between, on the 
one hand, the statistical analysis of measurements on a trait for a specific set of individuals in a 
specific range of situations, and hypotheses about the underlying genetic and environmental 
factors (Gap 2), on the other? (See qqPart II for a relevant reworking of quantitative genetic 
models and causal claims.) 
It would also be interesting to extend the concern about underlying heterogeneity (Gap 6) 
to human sciences more generally. What shortcomings of current methods of data analysis and 
interpretation might emerge if researchers questioned the methodological assumption that, when 
similar responses of different individual types are observed, similar conjunctions of genetic and 
environmental factors have been involved in producing those responses? Similarly, we might 
examine the heterogeneity underlying risk and protective factors in epidemiology (qqItems I and 
J). 
A final follow-up to Puzzle 3.2 stems from observing that, although some prominent 
geneticists have noted that heritability estimates are not helpful in identifying specific genetic 
factors (e.g., Rutter 2002, 4), the possible heterogeneity of factors that underlie patterns in 
observed traits has not yet been recognized as a significant issue, not only by quantitative 
geneticists but also by philosophers and other critical commentators on heritability research. For 
example, it was not mentioned as an issue in the extensive entry on heredity and heritability in 
the Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Downes 2004, but see Downes 2015qq), in the 
key sources cited therein (e.g., Sarkar 1998; Kaplan 2000), or in the rebuttal of many critiques of 
heritability studies by Sesardic (2005). What conceptual and sociological considerations have 





science have obscured the relevance of heterogeneity through visual and verbal conventions that 
emphasize types over variation? Perhaps they have they relied too much on scientists to set the 
terms of issues on which they focus their efforts in conceptual reconstruction? Similarly, perhaps 
sociologists have stuck too closely to the issues as debated by the scientists and the critics at the 
expense of delving into, as Williams (1980, 70) put it, the effects of concepts that the “opposing 
intellectual armies” share? How then, we might inquire, have each of the eight gaps been 
addressed or overlooked in previous studies and critiques? 
 
Puzzle 3.1 revisited: The two-part argument and the IQ paradox 
Having revisited Puzzles 3.2 and 3.3, we can return to Puzzle 3.1, which concerns 
average differences across generations and groups. The full puzzle is not solved here, but 
attention to the gaps allows us to dissolve the IQ paradox. Recall the two-part argument: the 
strong role of genetic factors within a group, coupled with the failure of environmental factors to 
explain differences among the average IQ test score for racial groups, lends plausibility to the 
idea that genetic factors are needed in an explanation. This plausibility depends, however, on 
interpreting high heritability within groups as evidence that genetic factors are more significant 
than environmental factors. When statistical patterns are seen as distinct from measurable 
underlying factors (Gaps 1 and 2) and we acknowledge the difficulties in translating from the 
patterns to hypotheses about the factors (Gaps 3 and 6), this interpretation of heritability no 
longer holds. The two-part argument can then be put to the side, thus there is no paradox. (This 
can be said even without invoking the unreliability of heritability estimates for humans [Gap 5]; 
the many steps between hypotheses and intervention based on well-founded claims [Gap 7]; and 
the within-group/between-group disconnect [Gap 8].)  
Although the specific IQ paradox is dissolved, the large average differences between 
groups and between generations on IQ test scores remain to be explained. The puzzle becomes: 
How do we identify the mix of genetic and environmental factors associated with those 
differences? Dickens and Flynn (2001) propose the use of reciprocal causation models, which 
involve two key features (Figure 3.5): a matching of environments to differences that may 
initially be small (e.g., children who show an earlier interest in reading will be more likely to be 
given books and receive encouragement for their reading and book learning); and a social 





environment of the individual (e.g., if people grow up and are educated with others who, on 
average, have higher IQ test scores, this will stimulate their own development).  
  
 
Figure 3.5 Dickens and Flynn’s (2001) Reciprocal Causation model (as depicted by the author). 
Small variation at birth is amplified by growing up in locations 0, 1, and 2 with environmental 
factors ef0, ef1, ef2 that in part match the differences in the trait and in part result from transient 
non-matching influences. In addition, the environmental factors in every individual’s location 
follows society-wide trends that result from the average of the changes across all individuals. 
The ranking of individuals at adulthood (or whenever the trait is measured) is correlated with the 
ranking at birth, but generation-to-generation trends can occur. 
 
However, once it is recognized that the potency of social multipliers depends on the 
different capacities of various groups to capitalize on historical changes in society, there is no 
reason to assume that the multipliers apply uniformly across individuals regardless of their 
differences in age, gender, geographical location, culture, and so on, or even that the multipliers 
move different individuals in the same direction albeit at different speeds. Adapting a basketball 
analogy that Dickens and Flynn use to illustrate their reciprocal causation model: The onset of 
TV coverage of basketball acted as a social multiplier by eliciting greater participation in 
basketball; at the same time, it elicited more couch-potato spectators. In more general terms, if 
researchers envision developmental pathways made up of components that might be quite 
different from one group of individuals to others, the challenge is to develop methods to collect 
and analyze the data so as to discriminate among possible reciprocal causation and other models 
(see qqItem J).  
The possibility that heterogeneous pathways underlie the variation in any given human 





genetic factors are to be included in the models of trait development, there are good 
methodological reasons for not categorizing individuals according to racial group membership 
(e.g., this grouping is not based on clustering across a range of locations [see Gap 6, path f]; and 
no measurable genetic factor admits a clean subdivision between whites and African Americans; 
see also Taylor 2008b). On the other hand, racial group membership continues to bring 
disadvantages to African American individuals and, reciprocally, to bring benefits to white 
individuals (Flynn 2000, 142ff) (moderated somewhat, but in a diminishing set of circumstances, 
by affirmative action for African Americans). Putting both considerations together means that, if 
exposing the best way to ameliorate the effects of racial group membership for any individual 
leads us to seek empirical models of the heterogeneous pathways of development, all those 
pathways may have to factor in the common effect of membership in a racial group. 
Suppose, give or take allowance for some common factors underlying the diverse 
pathways, we were to shift in focus from group membership to heterogeneous pathways. This 
move would come at the risk of bolstering a fiction that has gained currency in the United States, 
namely, that racial group membership no longer brings social benefits and costs. On the other 
hand, as long as researchers continue to track differences between averages for racial groups, 
they risk bolstering the ubiquitous stereotyping in which group membership is employed when 
deciding how to treat an individual. In sum, a genuine paradox that applies to the use of IQ test 
scores in US society seems to be that researchers and policy makers who want to move beyond 
explanations and policies based on racial group membership cannot escape taking into account 
the disadvantages and benefits individuals experience because of their group membership. 
* * * * * 
 The systematic presentation of the eight gaps was designed to show that, by and large, 
the methods of heritability studies cannot show anything clear and useful about the influence of 
genetic and environmental factors, especially in the case of human behaviors and other traits. I 
suspect that heritability studies would engender less debate all round if researchers admitted that 
they really want to be measuring genetic and perhaps environmental factors underlying the trait 
in question or even discussing the pathways of development that such measurable factors 
modulate (Turkheimer 2004, Keller 2010, and Tabery 2009, 2014). With such an admission, 
researchers would not need to use ambiguous terms (Gap 1), blur the trait-underlying factor 





(Gap 4). They might be comfortable considering alternatives to the standard assumptions in 
human heritability studies (Gap 5; see also Chapters 5 and 6) or even leaving behind any interest 




The Analysis of Variance is an Analysis of Causes (of a Very Circumscribed Kind) 
 
It is easy to think about measurable genetic and environmental factors as causes, e.g., if 
the fertilizer level for a wheat variety is increased the yield per unit area increases. However, 
heritability studies revolve around statistical patterns in the variation for the trait, which are 
distinct from those underlying factors (Gap 2 in Chapter 3). One way to accentuate the 
distinction is to articulate the specific—but quite limited—way in which the analysis of trait 
variation is an analysis of causes. I had a chance to do so when invited to provide a commentary 
on a reprinting of Richard Lewontin’s (1974a) “The Analysis of Variance and the Analysis of 
Causes,” an article widely cited in commentaries on heritability studies and more generally in 
philosophy of science (Tabery 2009).  
 
1974—Two publications 
The year 1974 saw the publication of two influential works by Richard Lewontin. In 
different ways, both addressed the measurement and characterization of genetic variation and 
asked whether this is interesting—what could we explain or do with the resulting knowledge? 
The Genetic Basis of Evolutionary Change (Lewontin 1974b) was firmly positioned 
within the population genetic tradition of viewing evolution as a change of gene frequencies in a 
population over time. In this light it was obviously important to characterize the amount of 
genetic variation and account for its maintenance. Lewontin masterfully synthesized research on 
genetic diversity in laboratory and natural populations in relation to models of selection or its 
absence. At the same time he drew attention to some troublesome themes for evolutionary 
biology. It was not variation as such that should count, but variation that resulted in differential 
fitness among the variants. Yet measurements of the components of fitness—survival and 
reproduction—were possible only when the phenotypic effect of a single allelic substitution was 
large not when the effects of gene substitutions make only small differences. This led Lewontin 
(1974b, 23) to remark that: “What we can measure is by definition uninteresting and what we are 
interested in is by definition unmeasurable.” The problems of relating models of selection to 





(1974b, 317). He concluded that population genetics should shift its attention to the fitness 
effects of long segments of chromosomes; such effects could be measured. 
The idea that many genes may contribute small effects to a trait derives from a different 
research tradition, quantitative genetics, which is the subject of the other publication, “The 
Analysis of Variance and the Analysis of Causes” (Lewontin 1974a; hereon, AVAC). 
Quantitative genetics concerns itself not with any specific genes having discrete (qualitative) 
effects but with the statistical analysis of continuous (quantitative) traits varying within 
populations (Lynch and Walsh 1998). Traditionally, the populations that quantitative genetics 
deals with have consisted of the varieties manipulated by plant and animal breeders, who use 
statistics to estimate the predicted rate of improvement in desired traits from possible matings or 
crosses. However, variation of traits in human populations has also been the subject of 
quantitative genetic analyses, most notably in behavioral genetics. Lewontin argued that such 
analyses are definitely not interesting for human genetics—the field of the journal in which 
AVAC appeared—they provide no basis for effective environmental or clinical interventions. 
A proper understanding of the statistical technique at the heart of quantitative genetics, 
the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), shows why quantitative genetics can provide little insight 
into underlying causes. In any ANOVA the ranking of varieties for the trait in question does not 
stay the same as we move from the environment or location that the varieties develop in to the 
next. Moreover, the degree of such re-ordering, the variety by location interaction (or genotype 
by environment interaction), is local, that is, conditional to the range of locations and sample of 
varieties in the data under consideration. It is more interesting, Lewontin proposed, to 
characterize and understand the norms of reaction—the different responses of genetically 
replicable varieties across the full range of environments. 
Lewontin considers norms of reaction to be an important concept for analysing evolution 
in changing environments. (Indeed, many of the abundant citations of AVAC are in that vein.) 
However, the paper was written less from his research on genetic variation in evolution than 
from his critique of Arthur Jensen’s quantitative genetic work on IQ test scores (Jensen 1969, 
1970, Lewontin 1970a, b).  Jensen claimed that the heritability of IQ test scores was high within 
human populations and interpreted the gap in average IQ test scores between racially defined 
human populations as probably based on genetic differences. Lewontin insisted that 





conceptually unrelated to how readily IQ test scores (or any other trait) could change when the 
environment changes. Moreover, as a political matter, the US society had by no means explored 
the full range of possible environments relevant to the development of IQ test scores. 
In the years since 1974 many researchers have not heeded Lewontin’s (1974a, 410) 
suggestion to “stop the endless search for better methods of estimating useless quantities.”  
Indeed, heritability estimates have continued to fuel policy and popular debates about the source 
of differences between averages for racial groups in IQ test scores and other traits. In this sense 
there has been a lot that researchers and policy makers have been able to do with the knowledge 
claims emerging from quantitative genetics of human traits. Accounting for this history would 
require sociological analysis beyond the scope of this commentary (or commentator). Let me 
note, however, that a significant, oppositional strand in this history has often referred to 
Lewontin’s arguments in AVAC and other places (Lewontin 1982). As a contribution to the 
ongoing efforts of philosophers, biologists, and others who criticize genetic explanations of 
differences in intelligence and other human behavioral traits, let me identify ways that 
Lewontin’s arguments could be strengthened, clarified, and adjusted so as to better illuminate 
why the knowledge that many human traits have high heritability has not shown the way to 
discoveries of their actual genetic basis. Ironically, this will depend on arguing that the ANOVA 
is an Analysis of Causes, but of a very circumscribed kind. 
 
2006—The analysis of variance and analysis of causes, revisited 
 
[Mis]understanding about the relationship between heritability and plasticity [of traits] ... 
arises from the entire system of analysis of causes through linear models... I will begin by 
saying some very obvious and elementary things about causes, but I will come thereby to 
some very annoying conclusions (Lewontin 1974a, 400). 
 
Lewontin’s argument in AVAC centers on four themes: 
a. Different kinds of genetic causes need to be distinguished. The influence of rare 





homozygous for the allele is a distinct kind of causality from the interaction of the environment 
and many genes of small effect. 
b. High heritability of a trait does not imply that it is hard to change through environmental 
changes. Lewontin invokes the case of curable “inborn errors of metabolism,” referring 
presumably to the dietary amelioration of the effects of homozygosity for the gene for 
phenylketonuria (PKU). 
c. The ANOVA analyses values of the observed trait; its underlying model does not refer to 
any measurable factors—either genetic factors (e.g. the presence or absence of specific alleles at 
one or more loci, tandem repeats, or chromosomes) or environmental. 
d. The ANOVA partitioning of variation in a trait is local, that is, conditional to the 
particular set of genetically replicable varieties and locations or environments for which the trait 
is observed. As plots of possible norms of reaction make clear, the differences among varieties 
and their relative ranking can change from a subset of the locations to the full set. 
How would I modify Lewontin’s argument? To the distinction in theme a., we might add 
the possibility of not-so-rare genes at a single locus whose effect on individuals depends on the 
environment (Moffitt et al. 2005). Indeed, with respect to difficulty of change (theme b.), even in 
the classic case of PKU, the “cure” is modulated by many social complexities (Paul 1998). But 
AVAC is not concerned with identification of single genes of major effect, so a more relevant 
illustration of changeability would be of changes in a trait not governed by a single gene. 
However, it is the distinction between observed traits and measurable factors (theme c.) that I 
want to focus on, because this means that the observation of traits that differ across varieties and 
locations provides no direct information about measurable genetic and environmental factors that 
correspond to these differences. When combined with knowledge from other sources, the 
ANOVA can, at best, help us to hypothesize about what specific measurable genetic and 
environmental factors might be worth further investigation (as noted in Bridge 2). 
To explore the implications of the observed trait/measurable factor distinction, let us 
consider the analysis of agricultural crop trials, where, as will emerge, the best case can be 
achieved, before returning to human genetics, where it cannot. Lewontin’s themes do not depend 
on the data subject to ANOVA being of human traits. Moreover, unlike the terms genotype and 
environment, the agricultural terms variety and location do not suggest what needs, in fact, to be 





measurable genetic and environmental factors. (Similar thinking leads me to refer to trait not 
phenotype; see Gap 1 in Chapter 3.) 
In a typical crop trial, a number of different plant varieties are grown in multiple plots or 
replicates in one or more locations and some trait, say, yield, is measured. For any trial there will 
be an overall mean for the trait from which any specific observation will deviate: 
Deviation from the overall mean yield of the yield of variety i grown in replicate k of 
location j 
= contribution associated with variety i 
+ contribution associated with location j 
+ contribution associated with the variety-location combination i,j 
+ residual. 
(In statistical terminology, the contributions are called effects. However, because this term has 
connotations of being a cause and just what is a cause is the topic for discussion, I adopt the non-
technical term contribution.)  
The relative sizes of the different kinds of contributions can be assessed by examining 
the relative sizes of their variances if the values of the contributions minimize the variance of the 
residual values and sum to zero for each kind of contribution. (Conditionality of the ANOVA, 
theme d., follows because the values of the contributions will not be the same if they are 
estimated only from a subset of the varieties or locations.) 
This model can be used to summarize or redescribe the data without making reference to 
the causes or dynamics that generated the data. However, researchers might want to construe the 
difference between variety i and j contributions as the cause of the difference between varieties i 
and j in their mean yield over all locations and replications. This construal of causes in terms of 
differences in contributions does not depend on researchers accepting the unrealistic assumption 
that traits result simply from the adding up of contributions and residuals (see AVAC, 408-9). 
Rather, it follows the philosophical principle that, if researchers want model-based associations 
to illuminate causes (in some sense of the term), these associations must be construed in relation 





Woodward 2003, Taylor 2005). For the ANOVA, the class of changes or interventions in which 
it makes sense to construe differences in contributions as causes can be visualized as follows. 
Suppose that the data are generated by unknown dynamics that include some 
unsystematic variation or noise. Imagine that the same set of varieties and locations is observed 
again and the only change in this rerun is noise at the same level as the original noise, but 
uncorrelated with it. If the noise is small so the rerun remains close to the original situation, an 
additive model can serve as a good approximation for a wide range of actual, but unknown, 
dynamics. (In technical terms, such an approximation is analogous to a truncated Taylor series 
expansion of dynamical equations around an equilibrium point.) The stipulation that everything 
remains close to the original situation means that, when differences in contributions are 
construed as causes, such causes are specific to the combination of varieties and locations that 
make up the observed data. Conditionality (theme d.) thus extends to these difference-in- 
contributions causes and should apply to any hypotheses about the actual dynamics that 
researchers draw from analysis of the data using additive models. 
Provided researchers recognize the close to the original situation, rerun assumption 
entailed by a difference-in-contributions construal of causes, they could use the ANOVA as a 
starting point in looking for specific, measurable genetic factors whose differences between the 
varieties corresponds to the differences in contributions. As a reiteration of the observed 
trait/measurable factor distinction (theme c.; see also Gaps 1-qq in Chapter 3), let us note that, 
although contributions associated with varieties are often called genetic contributions (or 
effects), this label is potentially misleading because the differences between variety 
contributions cannot be translated in any direct fashion into hypotheses about specific genetic 
factors. Similarly, there is a conceptual gap between ANOVA and analyses of environmental 
factors. (This gap is obscured when Lewontin invokes norms of reaction in AVAC, because 
norms of reaction link the observed trait to some measured environmental factor; Taylor 2006a.) 
For agricultural crop trials, hypothesis generation is enhanced by the use of cluster 
analysis to group varieties by similarity in responses across all locations (Byth et al. 1976). 
Varieties in any resulting group tend to be above average for a location in the same locations and 
below in the same (Figure 3 in Byth et al. 1976). The wider the variety of locations in the data on 





group are produced by the same conjunctions of measurable factors. If researchers can discount 
the possibility of heterogeneity (similar responses have been produced by different conjunctions 
of measurable factors), they can hypothesize about the group means—about what factors in the 
locations elicited basically the same response from varieties in a particular variety group that 
distinguishes them from other groups. Of course, knowledge from sources other than the data 
analysis is always needed to help researchers generate any (variety-group-specific and location-
specific) hypotheses about genetic and environmental factors. (See qqChapter qqTaylor 2006a 
for further discussion of heterogeneity, grouping, and generation of hypotheses.) 
If the genetic and environmental factors hypothesized as underlying the responses of 
varieties have been measured for the different varieties and locations, it is possible to use 
regression analysis to associate the yield with those factors and to undertake experimental trials 
that probe the associations by varying the factors. Insights from these studies can contribute to 
research on the ways in which pathways of growth and development are affected by the genetic 
make-up of varieties and the environmental factors in the locations—presuming such research 
has been taking place. This research might, in turn, provide a basis for interventions outside the 
typically well-controlled conditions in which research on causes in growth and development is 
undertaken. In summary, in agricultural research it is possible—at least in principle—to move 
beyond the circumscribed, rerun notion of cause. 
In human quantitative genetic research, however, genetically replicable varieties can at 
most be replicated in two locations (i.e. identical twins separated at birth) and these locations 
differ from one variety (twin pair) to the next. This means that grouping of varieties by similarity 
of responses across locations is impossible and the ANOVA cannot contribute to generating 
hypotheses about specific genetic and environmental factors (qq Taylor 2006a). Moreover, there 
is no way of discounting the possibility that any such factors could be heterogeneous—Puzzle 
3.1 in Chapter 3. Moreover, even if the trait of two genetically replicable varieties has been 
produced by similar conjunctions of measurable factors in one location, this need not be the case 
for the values observed for the trait in the next location. While subsequent investigation may 
show that the factors underlying similar responses are the same, no method of data analysis can 





Now, heritability, in the technical sense of the term, is calculated from contributions or 
variances estimated from an ANOVA (or equivalent analyses based on related additive models 
(note 5 in Ref. (3)QQ??)). It follows, therefore, that heritability also: 
a. is conditional to the particular set of varieties and locations observed (i.e. “local” in 
AVAC); 
b. has causal significance that rests on the same rerun conditions under which differences in 
contributions could be construed as a form of causality; and 
c. in the case of humans, offers no guidance in generating hypotheses about measurable 
genetic or environmental factors.  
If one wonders why a quantity having such limitations was ever invented, notice that it was first 
used in selective breeding in agricultural and laboratory settings where researchers do have the 
ability to replicate varieties and locations (give or take some variability of weather from season 
to season in the field). Indeed, when agricultural researchers compare varieties and make 
recommendations to farmers, and when they select among varieties for the next round of crop 
trials, they do so on the assumption that the environmental factors will remain unchanged. In 
short, heritability, like the ANOVA from which it is derived, has a relationship to genetic causes, 
but only in the very circumscribed rerun sense of causality. The fact that human heritability 
estimation is based on data that are less ideal than agricultural crop trials does not somehow, 
miraculously, allow researchers to support claims about more general (global) notions of genetic 
or environmental causality. 
The limitations of heritability may be seen, to borrow Lewontin’s phrase, as “very 
annoying conclusions” (AVAC, 400). To make these conclusions more digestible, it is helpful to 
note what heritability is not. It is common to refer to a trait as heritable or genetic if differences 
in the trait are caused by differences in specific genetic factors in the gene-based dynamics of 
reproduction of the organisms. When quantitative or behavioral geneticists describe a trait with 
high heritability as highly heritable (e.g., Turkheimer 2000), they allow their audience (and 
themselves) to envision a connection with genetic factors. Heritability, however, is defined on 
the basis of observed traits without reference to any information about measurable genetic (or 
environmental) factors. Admittedly, in some situations, heritability can be calculated as a ratio of 
so-called genetic variance to total variance for the trait (so-called phenotypic variance), but 





agricultural terminology of this commentary) not to the variance of specific measurable genetic 
factors. (Moreover, if heritability is estimated in a single location only, the variety-in-location 
contributions subsume the variety–location i,j interaction contributions from the full model 
stated earlier.) 
Elsewhere (Taylor 2006b) I have extended this line of thinking about the limited 
relevance of heritability in exposing and investigating genetic and environmental factors to argue 
that heritability can have no relevance in explaining differences between means for different 
human groups (e.g. so-called races) or different generations (Flynn 1994). These conclusions 
disturb the even-handed overview by Parens (2004) of past and potential contributions of human 
behavioral genetics to discussions of social importance, but they do not discount the persistent 
black-white test score gap in the US (Jencks and Phillips 1998). However, if we are going to 
learn useful things about the changeability of this gap and other human behavioral traits, we 
need to leave behind the persistent conflation of the ideas of heritability, genetic, and resistance 
to alteration by changing environmental factors. At the same time, we need to open up more 
conceptual space for deriving empirically validated models of developmental pathways whose 
components are heterogeneous and differ among individuals at any one time and over 
generations. Understanding what change in outcome people would see if factor f were changed at 
time t in development is an interesting challenge not only for human quantitative genetics but 
also for social epidemiology. (Impressive work in this direction is offered in Kendler et al. 2002, 
Ou 2005.) 
Of course, if we ask what people could do with that knowledge, we have to consider 
whether factor f could be changed in the situation in question and whether social and personal 
conditions could be changed to make the change in factor f realizable. There are, indeed, “plenty 





Gene-free Formulation of Classical Quantitative Genetics 
 
Given that statistical patterns in the variation for the trait are distinct from those 
underlying factors (Gap 2 in Chapter 3), it is incorrect or, at best, a confusing use of terms to 
interpret heritability as the fraction of variation “caused by (or attributable to) genetic 
differences” (Layzer 1974, 1259). Indeed, heritability studies or quantitative genetics is not the 
analysis of genes or genetic factors, but the analysis of continuous variation in traits of humans, 
other animals, or plants in ways that take account of the genealogical relatedness of the 
varieties whose traits are observed. How, I puzzled, can the errors and confusion that the name 
quantitative genetics invites best be dispelled?  
I noted the way that the models underlying the analysis of data about trait variation take 
different degrees of relatedness into account (e.g., to allow for identical twins being more closely 
related than fraternal twins). The models posit theoretical, idealized genes that have simple 
Mendelian inheritance and direct contributions to the trait. With such models, one component of 
the variation emerging from the analysis gets labeled genetic variance. However, given that the 
analysis is of variation in traits, the variation should be partitionable without using models of 
unobservable genes and their hypothetical effects; doing so would break the link with the 
mistaken or confused “genetic differences” interpretation of heritability. This chapter is the 
result of my puzzling through how to do this gene-free analysis. 
 
A notation that respects key distinctions 
Ambiguous terms (see Gap 1 in Chapter 3) and shorthand names (see Gap 2, a.) help lead 
to the common but unjustified interpretation of the partitioning of a trait’s variation into different 
components in terms of “the relative contributions of differences in genetic and non-genetic 
factors” (e.g., Wikipedia n.d., a). This conceptual slippage from traits to factors influencing the 
development of the trait needs a strong antidote, which is provided by the gene-free formulation 
developed in this chapter. 
First, recall that the terms variety and location were introduced in Chapter 3 as 
replacements for the ambiguous terms genotype and environment (see Gap 1). A variety is a 





given pair of parents, or a group of individuals whose mix of genetic factors can be replicated, as 
in an open pollinated plant variety or pure (genetically identical) line. A location is the situation 
or place in which the variety is raised, such as a family or a specific experimental research 
station. 
Second, the term variety-location interaction will be used here as a synonym only in the 
classical quantitative genetic sense of genotype-environment interaction (see equations 1 and 8 
below). In everyday terms, a high degree of variety-location interaction simply means that the 
responses of the observed varieties across the range of the observed locations do not parallel one 
another. That is, one variety may be highest for the trait in one location, but another variety may 
be highest in another location—or, at least, the difference between any two varieties may change 
substantially from location to location. This sense of genotype-environment interaction is 
distinct from the use of the same term (or, synonymously, gene-environment interaction) for 
situations in which genotype denotes a value of a measured genetic factor, environment denotes a 
value of a measured environmental factor, and an interaction means that the quantitative relation 
between the trait and one of the factors varies according to the measured value of the other factor 
(e.g., Moffitt et al. 2005).  
Now, consider the general case of an agricultural evaluation trial where it is possible to 
observe a set of animal or plant varieties in each of a set of locations, and to raise replicates for 
each variety-location combination. (Later we consider analysis of human data, which obviously 
cannot cover as many permutations as in the agricultural trial.) If the trait is recorded in all 
replicates, the data can be fitted to an additive or linear model that connects the values of the 
trait for an individual to the summation of several contributions: 
 
yijk =  m  +vi  +lj +vlij  +eijk  (1)  
where yijk denotes the measured trait y for the ith variety in the jth location and kth 
replication; 
m is a base level for the trait; 
vi is the additional contribution of the ith variety; 
lj is the additional contribution of the jth location; 
vlij is the additional contribution from the i,jth variety-location combination—in statistical 





eijk is an unsystematic or noise contribution adding to the trait measurement. 
 
(Recall from Chapter 4 that the term contribution is used in place of the technical term effect 
because the latter has an everyday connotation of the influence of some causal factor. Such a 
connotation tends to be especially confusing in the case of so-called “shared versus nonshared 
environmental effects”; Turkheimer 2000 and qqItem H.3.) 
 
Any additive model like equation 1 can be converted to a model that adds up variances 
related to these contributions. (Recall: variance is the common measure of variation.) Such a 
model allows the variance of the trait to be partitioned into these component variances (i.e., an 
analysis of variance or ANOVA). The conversion of equation 1 to variances is made as follows: 
If each kind of contribution is uncorrelated with any of the others, and m is set at the average of 
the trait over all varieties, locations, and replicates, then the average of each of the other 
contributions is zero. If m is subtracted from both sides of equation 1, which are then squared 
and divided by the total number of individuals to arrive at the average of these squared 
contributions, the result is the following partitioning of variance: 
 
Y = V + L +VL +E   (2) 
where 
Y denotes the variance of the yijk observations as a whole, 
V denotes the variance of the vi terms, etc. 
 
(This notation is used from here on: lower case letters with subscripts for contributions from 
specific varieties, locations, and replicates; upper case letters for variances corresponding to each 
contribution.) When both sides of equation 2 are divided by Y, we get the fractions of the overall 
variance summarized in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1. Fractions of variance of the observations as a whole 
Symbol* Source of variation Traditional names for fraction 
V/Y Between-variety averages Heritability (broad-sense) or h2 









E/Y Noise  Error; Residual; Between replicates 
* See text for definitions of symbols  
 
Consider how equation 1 can be fitted to the data from the agricultural evaluation trial (as 
illustrated schematically in Figure 3.3). To use the simplest case where the same number of 
replicates are observed for each variety-location combination, m is estimated by the average over 
all varieties, locations, and replicates; the estimate of vi is the average of yijk’s for variety i across 
all the observed locations and replicates minus the estimate for m; similarly for the estimate of lj. 
The estimate of vlij is the average of yijk’s for variety-location combination i-j after allowing for 
vi , lj , and m, that is, the average minus the estimates for the other three quantities. 
(In practice, it is possible to partition the variance of the traits—to fit observations to, in 
this case, equation 2—without making explicit the original additive model—in this case, 
equation 1—and without estimating the values of the various contributions that fit the data. 
Nevertheless, the partitioning of variation can always be related back to an additive model of 
contributions.) 
Equation 1 was introduced in the context of a trial where a set of animal or plant varieties 
is grown in every one of a set of locations. However, all the variances in equation 2 can still be 
estimated even if observations are made only in a subset of all the variety-location combinations 
as long as the subset is randomly chosen from the range of possibilities. (Of course, smaller 
subsets produce more variable estimates. That is to say, if the estimation were repeated over a 
number of subsets, the results would vary from subset to subset.) 
The observations of the trait for a set of varieties and locations might also be divided into 
classes in various ways. For example, a class might be defined by all observations in which the 
variety is the same. In that case, equation 1 shows that, within the class of ith variety, m and vi 
are constant, but the other terms vary. The expected average for the trait in question for the class 
is m + vi (because the average in the class of each of the other contributions is zero), and the 
variance of those averages across classes is V. Similarly, for classes defined by all observations 





defined by all observations in which both the variety and the location are the same, the variance 
of the averages for the classes is V + L + VL. 
When the variances of the contributions that do not vary within the class (and are thus 
included in the class averages) are compared to the overall variance, Y, the results are what are 
called intraclass correlations. (Although intraclass correlations are a ratio of variances, the label 
correlation makes sense if it is noted that for classes of size two, this quantity is mathematically 
equivalent to the usual linear correlation of the two values when the order in each pair is 
arbitrary, as would be the case if one wanted to know the correlation, say, of heights in same-sex 
couples; Howell 2002.) Finally, if the sum of the first two intraclass correlations is subtracted 
from the third, the result would be VL, and if the last intraclass correlation is subtracted from 1, 
the result would be E. With intraclass correlation denoted by I and the subscript specifying the 
class, the following equations summarize this paragraph: 
 
V /Y   = IV    (3) 
L / Y    = IL    (4) 
(V + VL + L) /Y = I(V,L,VL)   (5) 
 
Equations 2-5 imply that  
VL /Y   = I(V,L,VL)  – IV  – IL (6) 
E/Y   = 1   - I(V,L,VL) (7) 
  
It is possible to estimate these intraclass correlations even if observations are made only 
in a subset of all the variety-location combinations, just as it is possible to partition the variance 
in the trait according to equation 2 in such subsets. Again, the subsets need to be randomly 
chosen from the full data set, ensuring no systematic differences between classes in the 
contributions from varieties, locations, variety-location combinations, and noise. Finally, there 
are statistical techniques that estimate the variances without calculating intraclass correlations, 
but the form of equations like 3 to 7 is used here to allow readers without training in statistical 
theory to appreciate the conceptual points.  
 





The analysis or partitioning of trait variation in the preceding formulation neither 
requires knowledge of nor, on its own, produces knowledge about the genetic or environmental 
factors that influence the trait (or “phenotype”) in the various variety-location (or “genotype-
environment”) combinations. (This is also the case when path analysis and Structural Equation 
Modeling are used to partition the variation in a trait; see Item qqF.5). However, in estimating 
the fractions of the overall variance using equation 2 or using intraclass correlations, we have yet 
to take into account the genealogical relatedness between varieties.  
Consider, therefore, a special case of the agricultural evaluation trial in which the 
varieties are replicated as twins or as relatives of some other known relatedness (e.g., half-
siblings, cousins). Conceptually, the simplest analysis of variation in traits between relatives 
involves a comparison of three classes: monozygotic (MZ) twins raised apart (i.e., in randomly 
chosen locations); unrelated varieties (for humans: individuals) raised together within the same 
location (for humans: family); and MZ twins raised together (i.e., both members of each pair in 
the same location). Denoting these classes as MZA, UVT, and MZT, respectively, the formulas 
for intraclass correlations (derived again by identifying the contributions that do not vary within 
the replicates, i.e., twin pairs) are re-expressions of equations 3-7:  
 
V /Y   = IMZA    (3') 
L / Y    = IUVT    (4') 
(V + VL + L) /Y = IMZT    (5') 
 
Equations 2 and 3'-5' imply that  
 
VL /Y   = IMZT  – IMZA – IUVT  (6') 
E/Y   = 1  - IMZT   (7') 
 
To bring other classes, such as dizygotic (DZ) twins, into the picture, an elaboration of 
equation 1 is needed: 
 





where yijk, m, lj, eijk are as before;  
tik denotes an additional contribution from the kth twin (replicate) in the ith variety;  
tlijk is an additional contribution from the kth twin in the i,jth variety-location combination;  
v-i and vl-ij replace the vi and vlij contributions in equation 1. (The superscript indicates 
that the new contributions would tend to be smaller given that tik and tlijk contribute to 
differences between twins [replicates].) 
 
The partitioning of variance corresponding to equation 8 is: 
 
Y = V-  +T + L + VL-  + TL  +E (9)  
where V- denotes the overall variance of the vi- terms, etc. 
 
Noting that for MZ twins ti1 = ti2 and tlij1 = tlij2, the intraclass correlations for the MZT and DZT 
classes are: 
 
(V-  +T + L + VL-  + TL ) / Y= IMZT (10)  
(V-   + L + VL-  ) / Y= IDZT (11)  
 
Note that V- +T = V and VL- + TL = VL. Define a parameter, g: 
 
g  = (V- + VL-) / (V + VL)  (12) 
or, equivalently, 
 
1 - g = (T + TL) / (V + VL)   (13) 
 
The value of g can be empirically determined if data from all three classes MZT, DZT, and UVT 
are available. Based on equations 4’, 10 and 11: 
 






If V+ is used in place of (V + VL) (for reasons that emerge in Item E), equations 10 and 11 can 
be rearranged to yield: 
 
V+ / Y  = (IMZT – IDZT) / (1- g)     (15) 
L / Y  = (IDZT - g IMZT) / (1- g)    (16) 
 
Equivalent parameters and equations can be formulated for classes of relatives other than 
twins (Box D). However, the preceding formulation suffices as a proof of principle: gene-free 
analyses of variation can be formulated that take degree of relatedness into account through a 
parameter to be empirically determined. (Table 5.1 summarizes examples of gene-free analyses 
for twins.)  
 
Box 5.1. Gene-free formulations for classes of relatives other than twins 
Gene-free formulations can be derived and applied through five steps: 
1. Define varieties in terms of the progenitors for individuals in the variety, e.g., a clone, a pair 
of parents, one mother and unrelated fathers, a pair of grandparents. 
2. Specify the variant of equation 8 that encompasses the different kinds of relatives possible for 
such progenitors (e.g., siblings, first cousins). 
3. Spell out the intraclass correlation equations for the different kinds of relatives in the different 
circumstances (e.g., raised together, raised apart). 
4. Rearrange the intraclass correlation equations to produce estimators for the variance fractions 
and for any empirically determined parameter that had to be introduced to take degree of 
relatedness into account.  
5. Collect data for the classes of relatives needed in order to estimate the variance fractions and 
parameters of interest using the equations from step 4. 
 
Table 5.1. Gene-free analyses for twins 
Data Set & Assumption Values that can 
be estimated* 
Equations 






2. MZT, DZT (assuming some value of g, not 
necessarily = .5) 
V+ L E 15, 4’ or 16, 7’ 
3. MZT, DZT, UVT in the same population 
(with actual value of g estimated) 
V+ L E 14, 15, 4’ or 16, 7’ 
4. MZT, MZA, UVT in the same population V VL L E 3’, 4’, 6’, 7’ 
5. MZT, DZA, DZT, UVT in the same 
population (and assuming that V- / VL- and T / 
TL are equal) 
V VL L E 12, 13, 14, 15, 4’ or 16, 
7’;  
also V- / Y = IDZA 
* Estimated as fractions of Y.  V+ denotes V + VL 
 
3. A numerical illustration of the gene-free formulation 
The terms in which the gene-free formulation has been introduced are not dependent on 
any specific data set. Nevertheless, for readers who want to see how this formulation plays out in 
numbers, this section provides a numerical illustration of the gene-free formulas applied to one 
of the simulated data sets from Appendix 1. (Appendix 1 covers a wide range of values of broad-
sense heritability, V/Y, and other fractions of variance. It also contrasts estimates of fractions of 
variance given by equations 15 and 16 with those from equations 18 and 19, which are to be 
introduced in Chapter 6.)  
First, equation 8 is used to generate simulated observations for monozygotic and 
dizygotic twin pairs for a set of 100 varieties raised together in each of a set of 100 locations 
(MZT and DZT), for twin pairs raised in different locations (MZA), and for unrelated varieties 
raised together (UVT). Each observation derives from the same pre-set values of the fractions of 
variance. The relevant equations from the gene-free formulation are then applied to the complete 
data set to estimate the values used in generating the observations (Table 5.2). Given the random 
process to generate these observations, the estimates should not be identical to the pre-set values. 
There is, however, a close match, with the greatest discrepancy evident in the estimate of g. 
 
Table 5.2. A comparison of the original values and estimates applying intraclass correlation 













V/Y .4 IMZA 3 .41 
L/Y .2 IUVT 4 .21 
VL/Y .2 IMZT-IMZA-IUVT 6 .19 
E/Y .2 1-IMZT 7 .19 
g .3 (IDZT-IUVT) / (IMZT-IUVT) 14 .25 
 
Next, equations 15 and 16 are applied to the complete data set to produce estimates of V+ 
and L as fractions of Y (Table 5.3). The estimates also match the values corresponding to those 
used in generating the observations, but not as closely as in Table 5.2 (which is not surprising, 
given that g, the least-close match above, factors into the equations).  
 
Table 5.3. A comparison of the original values and estimates applying equations 15 and 16 to the 













.6 = .4 + .2 (IMZT – IDZT)  
/ (1- g) 
15 .57 
L/Y .2 (IDZT - g IMZT)  
/ (1- g) 
16 .23 
 
Finally, to mimic the situation found in human twin studies, subsets of the full data set 
are randomly sampled so that a given MZ variety is observed only for one location in the MZT 
sample, similarly for the DZT sample, and varieties and locations for the MZT and DZT samples 
do not overlap. Table 5.4 presents results for samples of 48 MZT pairs, 48 DZT pairs and 48 
UVT pairs, with the sampling process repeated 100 times. The actual value lies within a small 
interval around the estimate (less than 1 standard deviation), but the match for the samples is not 





is used.  
 
Table 5.4. A comparison of the original values and estimates applying equations 15 and 16 to 















.6 (IMZT – IDZT)  
/ (1- g) 
15 .52 (.14) 
L/Y .2 (IDZT - g IMZT) / 
(1- g) 
16 .24 (.14) 
 
4. Technical conditions and data availability 
The partitioning of variance in the preceding sections depends on certain technical 
conditions:  
a. An agreed-on scale has been used for measuring the trait and calculating the variance to 
be partitioned into fractions.  
b.  If not all variety-location combinations are represented in the data—as is obviously the 
case for human data sets—the sampling of combinations is random or, at least, produces no 
variety-location (“genotype-environment”) correlations. Moreover, there are no systematic 
differences between the varieties and locations in which MZ pairs are observed and those in 
which DZ pairs are observed. 
c. Zygosity of twins (i.e., monozygotic versus dizygotic) is correctly ascertained and 
representatively sampled. (Similarly, for classes of relatives other than twins.) 
d. The same overall variance of the trait applies in any of the classes as in the general case, 
e.g., Y in equations 10 and 11 refers to the same quantity. 
e. Estimates are given with standard deviations, confidence intervals, or other assessments 
of their statistical uncertainty. 
f. Statistical bias in the estimation of the parameters and fractions of variance is not 
substantial or is corrected for (Donoghue and Collins 1990).  





or experience of members of a class within a location is unaffected by their degree of relatedness 
(e.g., whether they are MZ twins, DZ twins, or unrelated).  
Whether these conditions can be met in human situations, or whether it matters when 
they are not, are issues of ongoing controversy (e.g., Richardson and Norgate 2005; for 
accessible reviews, see Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2002, Parens and Chapman 2006). For 
example, Bouchard and McGue (1981) use estimates of intraclass correlations for human IQ test 
scores averaged from many studies; standard deviations or confidence intervals are not shown.  
The averaging clearly does not meet condition d., let alone show readers that the technical 
conditions applied in each of the cases that went into the average. 
In agricultural situations the technical conditions can, in principle, be met; data sets that 
allow estimation of components of variance using equations 3'–7' are routine. At the same time, 
data have not yet been collected with a view to using the gene-free formulation of quantitative 
genetics to compare classes of defined degrees of relatedness. Indeed, a considerable effort 
would be required to use the steps of Box 5.1 to spell out equations that encompass the variety of 
degrees of relatedness addressed in classical quantitative genetics (e.g., Holland 2003). In this 
era of molecular genetics, it may be hard to find the resources and interest for such an 
undertaking. Nevertheless, the gene-free formulation as introduced in this item allows for a fresh 
look at classical quantitative genetics. As Chapter 6 will show, the implications for genetic 




The Results and Interpretation of Classical Quantitative Genetics under Alternatives to 
Three Standard Assumptions 
 
 Under Chapter 5’s gene-free formulation of classical quantitative genetics, the meaning 
of the components or fractions of trait variation differ from their traditional interpretation. But, 
some skeptical readers have asked, does it make much difference to the estimates of the 
fractions? As I noted, data have not yet been collected in the appropriate categories with a view 
to showing this. In the absence of such data, I looked for other ways to show the significance of 
the gene-free formulation. I identified three assumptions involved in standard quantitative 
genetics practice, identified plausible alternatives, and used the gene-free formulation to draw 
out the implications. (These assumptions have been previously identified in quantitative genetics 
or critical commentaries, but this chapter’s account makes use of the gene-free formulation of 
classical quantitative genetics from Chapter 5.) 
 
Assumption 1. Partitioning of trait variation into components requires models of 
theoretical genes with simple Mendelian inheritance and direct contributions to the trait.  
As an example of this assumption, consider the common ADCE model for human twin 
studies (e.g., Feng et al. 2009), which can be expressed as: 
 
 yijk =  m +  aik + dik  + lj  + eijk  (17)  
where yijk, m, lj, eijk are as before (with l replacing c for consistency with the terminology 
of Item D); 
aik denotes an “additive” genetic contribution from the kth twin in the ith variety; 
dik denotes a “dominance” genetic contribution from the kth twin in the ith variety;  
with i = j if the twins are raised in the same location. 
 
(In the corresponding partitioning of variance, A/Y estimates heritability in the narrow sense.)  
The terms additive and dominance derive from the construction of the standard models of 
quantitative genetics (Falconer and Mackay 1996; Lynch and Walsh 1998), which builds from 





the individuals are raised in a single location. In that location, the genes contribute directly to the 
trait in the sense that the presence or level of such a trait depends only on whether the individual 
has two copies of one allele (i.e., is homozygote for that allele), two of the other, or one of each 
(heterozygote). Dominance refers to the degree that heterozygous individuals depart from the 
intermediate between the two homozygous forms. The variance in the single-locus trait in a 
given location depends on the difference between the homozygous forms, the degree of 
dominance, and the frequency of the different alleles. 
For example, phenylketonuria (PKU) in humans is associated with having two copies of 
a malfunctioning allele for the enzyme phenylalanine hydroxylase (PAH). The cognitive 
development of such individuals is extremely impaired by the level of phenylalanine present in 
normal diets. The heterozygote condition generally goes undetected (but see Alós et al. 1993); in 
other words, the functioning allele is completely dominant. In a location defined by access only 
to normal diets, relatives would resemble each other across multiple traits more than unrelated 
individuals would. The greater resemblance follows because if, say, a twin has PKU, both 
parents have at least one copy of the malfunctioning PAH allele, so the other twin is more likely 
to have two malfunctioning PAH alleles than is an unrelated individual (i.e., one chosen at 
random from the population).  Similarity in cognitive impairment follows directly.  In a location 
defined by access to a special low-phenylalanine diet and adherence to that diet by individuals 
who are homozygous for the malfunctioning allele, relatives would resemble each other only a 
little more than unrelated individuals for most traits, such as IQ test scores.  They would still 
resemble each other more than unrelated individuals in relation to the ability to metabolize 
phenylalanine (Paul and Brosco 2013). 
For a trait governed by alleles at a single locus, the resemblance of relatives for the given 
trait is quantified by the intraclass correlation. For MZ twins this is 1—there is no variation 
within the pairs—but for DZ twins or pairs of other relatedness, the resemblance varies. (Recent 
research shows discordance between MZ twins at the genetic level, e.g., Bruder et al. 2008, but 
the simplification of an intraclass correlation of 1 for MZ twins is preserved in this book.) For 
example, in the case of PKU in locations where the special diet is not available, a proportion of 
functioning PAH in human populations greater than .98 translates to an intraclass correlation of 
DZ twins and full siblings close to 1/4.  





quantitative genetics envision the influence of alleles at many loci adding up to shape the traits, 
and thus to contribute to the variances of trait values that are to be analyzed. The models allow 
for some noise (from measurement error or unsystematic variation between the replicates of the 
variety) and for the variety to be raised in a number of locations (by incorporating into the 
equations a term for variance across locations of the average value of the trait in each location). 
Variety-location interaction as well as variety-location correlation can also be included in the 
models (Lynch and Walsh 1998, 107ff). 
An alternative to this first assumption is to analyze the variation in a trait without making 
reference to theoretical genes, their dominance relations at individual loci, or their summation 
over many loci. The gene-free analysis of variation (Chapter 5) simply starts with the traits and 
their variance and incorporates an empirical parameter to take degree of relatedness into account.  
 
Assumption 2. All other things being equal, similarity in traits for relatives is proportional 
to the number of genes common to the relatives as a fraction of the genes that vary in the 
population.  
Under this second assumption, all other things being equal (i.e., equal location and noise 
contributions), DZ twins, for example, would be half as similar as MZ twins because MZ twins 
share all their genes, while DZ twins share, on average, half of the genes that vary in the 
population (as stated, e.g., by Kendler and Prescott 2006, 42). (The common statement that DZ 
twins share half of their genes is potentially misleading given that it obscures the large 
proportion of genes shared by all members of any given species.) This assumption is equivalent 
to setting g to .5 in equation 12, which means that equations 15 and 16 from Chapter 5 become: 
 
V+/ Y  = 2 (IMZT – IDZT)    (18) 
L / Y  = 2 IDZT - IMZT     (19) 
 
Equations 18 and 19 resemble the standard formulas using data from MZ and DZ twins to 
estimate broad-sense heritability and the fraction of variance for locations, e.g., Rijsdijk and 
Sham (2002), except that equation 18 refers to V+/ Y, whereas heritability is, by definition, V/ Y 
(a discrepancy to be discussed under Assumption 3). Assumption 2 is also reflected in the 





(Lynch and Walsh 1998, 823ff). 
One alternative to this second standard assumption is using an empirical determination of 
parameters to account for defined degrees of relatedness. For example, g can be estimated using 
equation 14 and the fractions of variance for V+ and L can be estimated using equations 15 and 
16 instead of equations 18 and 19. (Similarly, for parameters in equivalent equations when 
classes of relatives other than twins are studied; see Box 5.1.) 
 
Assumption 3. In analyses of human data, variety-location-interaction variance 
(“genotype-environment interaction” variance) can be discounted. 
First, recall from Chapter 5 that interaction variance refers here to the classical 
quantitative genetics sense of the term. (The conceptually distinct interactions between measured 
genetic and environmental factors are not discounted in human studies; for an entry point, see 
Moffitt et al. 2005 and Item qqI.2.) The assumption that variety-location-interaction variance can 
be discounted enters when the interaction terms are omitted from the additive model for 
partitioning of variance (e.g., the ACDE model) or when V+/Y in equations 15 or 18 is taken to 
estimate V/Y. 
The origins of the third assumption can be seen in the single-locus case used as the 
theoretical starting point for the standard models of quantitative genetics (see Assumption 1 
above). Heritability in the single-locus case is within-location heritability, and, as such, is related 
to V+/ Y, not V/ Y. To visualize why this is so, consider equation 1 restricted to some given 
location j. In that location, m +lj is constant across all observations, but vi +vlij varies with i (the 
variety), so the variance of these within-location variety contributions is V + VL. This feature of 
the standard model is not altered by the subsequent incorporation into the model of terms for 
noise and location variance.  
An alternative to discounting variety-location interaction is to include interaction terms in 
the additive model and then to secure the kinds of data needed to estimate the separate fractions 
of variance associated with V and VL. (For example, for twins, equations 15 and 18 cannot 
separate the V and VL fractions, but equations 3’ and 6’ can, provided data are available for 
MZT, MZA, and UVT.  Given that data for MZA in humans are rare, data on DZA and UVT 
from adoption studies could be used instead provided it is assumed that V- / VL- and T / TL are 






Implications of gene-free formulations and contrasting assumptions for classical 
quantitative genetics partitioning of trait variation 
The gene-free formulation and alternatives to the standard assumptions have key 
implications for interpreting any classical quantitative genetics partitioning of trait variation into 
components, and thus for subsequent research and applications based on those interpretations. 
Again, some of the issues in this section have been raised before (as have other important issues, 
such as the technical conditions listed in Chapter 5, Section 4), so the discussion here is focused 
on what follows from the gene-free formulation and the alternative assumptions. (To be clear: 
the purpose is to elaborate on the gene-free formulation, not to argue that these issues can be 
raised only using that formulation.) The implications are drawn at a theoretical level and are not 
dependent on empirical data from any particular situation. (Possible implications at an empirical 
level can be seen in the data sets in Appendix 1.) 
 
Gene-free quantitative genetics 
a. Distinction between traits and underlying measurable factors.  
As noted previously, the quantitative genetics term heritability is commonly described in terms 
like the “contribution of genetic differences to observed differences among individuals” (Plomin 
et al. 1997, 83) or the “fraction of the variance of a phenotypic trait in a given population caused 
by (or attributable to) genetic differences” (Layzer 1974, 1259). In such descriptions, the 
distinction between traits and underlying measurable factors is not kept clear (Gap 2 in Chapter 
3). The gene-free formulation, by using models that make no reference to theoretical genes, 
serves as a reminder that translation from descriptive quantitative genetics analyses of traits to 
hypotheses about causal factors is far from direct (Gaps 3, 6, and 7). The difficulty of translation 
to hypotheses about measurable factors also applies to the fraction of trait variation for between-
location means and for interaction, i.e., between means for variety-location combinations. (See 
also Item H.3 for an interpretation of residual variance as “non-shared environmental effects.”)  
To remark on the distinction is not new, but it is often obscured by the language used, as 
evidenced in the quotes above, or by combining in one analysis measurable factors and variation 
between varieties and locations (Item H). (Keeping the distinction between traits and underlying 





location in place of genotype and environment; see Gap 1 in Chapter 3.) 
 
b. Interpretations based on contributions of theoretical genes not necessary.  
Given the existence of a formulation of classical quantitative genetics free of reference to 
theoretical genes (Item D), data need not be interpreted with reference to the contribution of 
differences in unknown genetic factors or their interactions. In particular, literal readings are not 
required for additive models that refer to dominance and nonadditive genetic variance (e.g., 
equation 17). Moreover, although narrow-sense heritability will be less than broad-sense 
heritability, we do not have to ascribe that difference to a fraction of the variance reflecting 
dominance relations at individual loci of theoretical genes. Now, it may turn out in practice that 
formulas for narrow-sense heritability provide more accurate predictions of change in a trait 
under artificial selection than do formulas for broad-sense heritability, but establishing that 
outcome is an empirical matter. It is not something resolvable by reference to quantitative 
genetic models based on theoretical genes.  
 
Estimation and interpretation of similarity in traits for relatives  
a. Similarity between relatives determined empirically.  
Other than in trivial situations, the use of the gene-free formulation to compare classes of 
defined degrees of relatedness requires parameters such as g in the case of MZ versus DZ twins. 
These parameters can be determined empirically, provided the appropriate classes of data are 
available (Box 5.1 and Table 5.1) and provided the necessary technical conditions have been 
shown to hold (Chapter 5). The empirically determined values may depart from the commonly 
used heuristic values. Under the standard assumptions, observed departures from heuristic values 
have led to interpretations in terms of dominance relations at individual loci or non-additivity of 
the summation over many loci. However, as noted above, the availability of a formulation of 
classical quantitative genetics free of reference to (theoretical) genes implies that data need not 
be interpreted with reference to the contribution of differences in actual (unknown) genetic 
factors or their interactions. 
  
b. Relevant correlations based on observed traits, not the proportion of shared genes that 





One virtue of the empirical determination is being able to dispense with the second standard 
assumption, which is not a reliable heuristic. This unreliability can be shown by using plausible 
models of the contributions of multiple genes to a trait and finding, all other things being equal, 
ratios of DZ similarity to MZ similarity that are not .5 and that vary considerably around their 
average. Consider, for example, a disease trait modeled in the following way: The trait occurs 
when the combined “dosage” from many loci exceeds a threshold, where each pair of alleles 
contributes a full, zero, or half dose according to whether the alleles are, respectively, both the 
same for one variant, both the same for the other, or one of each. In this case, the intraclass 
correlation varies according to the frequency of alleles, level of dominance, and so on. The 
varying values are mostly above .5 even when there is no dominance (as summarized in 
Appendix 2).  
Of course, it is possible to put forward more complicated models of the interaction of 
genes and the timing of their influence during development. The point here does not, however, 
depend on the validity of the model in the previous paragraph or of any particular hypothetical 
model of multiple genes contributing to the trait. The reason that the standard assumption is 
unreliable is simply that the relevant correlations need to be based on observed traits and, as 
such, cannot be directly drawn from the proportion of shared genes that influence the 
development of those traits. (This assertion is not affected by researchers now being able to 
determine empirically the exact proportion of genes shared for particular relatives in a given 
population; Visscher et al. 2006.) For the same reason, heuristic values of the similarity of 
relatives of other degrees (half-siblings, cousins, etc.), which are ubiquitous in classical 
quantitative genetics, are also unreliable. 
 
c. Possible research program for estimation of empirical parameters in agricultural 
situations and extrapolation to human situations.  
What average value and range would empirically determined values for genealogical relatedness 
have in agricultural and laboratory populations, where empirical estimation is not difficult? In 
studies of twins in such populations, is the value of g generally close to .5?  How widely do the 
values vary? If the average value and ranges for agricultural and laboratory populations are 
extrapolated to human quantitative genetics, what adjustment is needed to previously reported 





of the equivalent values that arise in gene-free derivations of analyses for comparing relatives of 
other degrees of relatedness.  Is there a linear relation between the empirically determined values 
for relatives of various degrees and the fraction of variable genes that each kind of relative 
shares? Perhaps a research program based on these questions would show consistent patterns; 
perhaps results would depend on the specific trait for the specific species for the specific 
locations in which the individuals were raised. That cannot be known until the investigations are 
carried out. 
 
Variety-location-interaction variance estimated, not discounted 
Variety-location interaction variance is routinely estimated in agricultural studies. 
(Recall, from Chapter 5, that interaction variance refers here to the classical quantitative genetics 
sense of the term.) A significant interaction variance tempers any recommendations to farmers to 
adopt a certain variety that has a high average across locations for a desired trait. Having a set of 
varieties observed in each of a set of locations makes it straightforward to estimate V and VL 
separately (performing an ANOVA based on equation 2 in Chapter 5). In studies of human twins 
raised together, in contrast, each variety is observed in one location with two replicates (twins) 
for each of those variety-location combinations. Without collecting data for twins raised apart 
(see Table 5.1), there is no way to ascertain how much the variation between varieties would 
change if the varieties were observed in locations (families) other than the ones in which they 
were actually observed, that is, there is no way to separate VL out of V+. 
How does interaction variance in human studies line up with the range of the levels found 
in the agricultural studies? (The large agricultural field trials mentioned in the introduction 
typically showed substantial interaction variance.  The studies reviewed by Tabery [2014, 147-
152] provide a more mixed picture.)  The potential importance of interaction variance has long 
been noted (e.g., Layzer 1974, Lewontin 1974a, Plomin et al. 1977, Jacquard 1983; see 
Appendix 3 for contrasting formulations in mathematical notation).  Yet the additive models 
used in partitioning variance in human quantitative genetics generally omit the interaction 
component, as evident in path diagrams (see Item qqF.5).  Plomin et al. (1977), which is often 
cited in the context of low interaction variance for humans, considers only a proxy for variety-
location interaction. For some trait, e.g., educational attainment, the statistical interaction of the 





proxy measures reflect actual variety-location interaction is, however, hard to assess in the 
absence of studies for a range of human traits in which the classes of data are collected that 
allow VL/Y to be separated out from V+/ Y. (Tabery 2014, 152ff reviews for various human 
traits the evidence for low values of such proxy measures.) 
If we do not assume that variety-location interaction variance can be discounted in 
human studies, two common claims become open to scrutiny: i. The effect of family members 
growing up in the same location (family) is of small importance; ii. The trend for heritability 
estimates to increase over people's lifetimes is evidence that so-called genetic differences come 
to eclipse so-called environmental differences (Plomin 1999, C26). The first claim requires 
showing not only that the location variance is a small component of the total variance, but also 
that the variety-location-interaction variance is small (and thus V+/Y close to V/Y). The second 
claim also requires showing that the variety-location-interaction variance is negligible; otherwise 
it could equally well be that it is the interaction component that increases over time. 
 
Recapitulation: Three problem points in the standard derivation of quantitative genetics  
This section follows a slightly different path to convey the implications of the three 
contrasting pairs of assumptions, but it ends up affirming the previous sections as it identifies 
three problem points in the standard derivation of quantitative genetics. 
As mentioned under Assumption 1, the standard derivation of quantitative genetics 
begins from a model of a trait governed by a pair of alleles at a single locus where all the 
individuals are raised in a single location (Falconer and Mackay 1996; Lynch and Walsh 1998). 
In other words, there are no contributions corresponding to differences between locations or to 
differences between replicates (i.e., noise from measurement error or unsystematic variation 
between the replicates of the variety) and V and VL are subsumed in a single term (as explained 
in Assumption 3).  Let us call this combined term YS for the variance for a single locus in a 
single location. The intraclass correlation for MZ twins is 1, but for DZ twins the value varies 
with the degree of dominance and the frequency of the two alleles. Let us call this quantity g. 
(The difference, 1-g, corresponds to the average variance within the DZ twin pairs.)  
Next, the standard models of quantitative genetics envision the influence of alleles at 
many loci adding up to shape the traits to be observed and analyzed. If each pair of alleles is 





is independent of the others—then the ratio of the variation between averages for DZ twins to 
the total variance is unchanged and the intraclass correlations remain the same. (Note that, 
because these intraclass correlations incorporate no environmental or unsystematic influences, 
they have been labeled as genetic similarity or genetic correlation. However, to avoid any risk of 
implying that similarity in traits as analyzed in classical quantitative genetics has a direct relation 
to similarity in genetic factors, the potentially misleading adjective genetic is not used in the 
discussion of similarity in this book.) 
Next, the models allow for some noise, which is assumed to be equal for both kinds of 
twins. In other words, E in equation 9 is the same when the equation refers to MZ twins as when 
it refers to DZ twins. Finally, when varieties are raised in a number of locations, the standard 
models incorporate a term for variance across locations of the average value of the trait in each 
location. Again, the models assume that this term, L, is equal for the different classes of 
relatives. In sum, for MZ twins, the variance between twin pairs has increased in steps from YS 
to YS +E to YS + L +E and, for DZ twins, from g YS + L +E to g YS + E to g YS + L +E.  
Now, for a trait observed at a single location and governed only by alleles at a single 
locus, the intraclass correlations for DZ twins (or other classes of defined degrees of relatedness) 
can be determined exactly. However, to extrapolate from this and conclude that the same ratio 
holds for other kinds of traits requires evidence for the assumptions built into the subsequent 
steps in the derivation (e.g., each pair of alleles adds a small contribution independently of the 
others). Such evidence is lacking, which is not surprising given the problems inherent in trying 
to discriminate between the contributions of many different loci (Lewontin 1974bqq). This lack 
of evidence for assumptions is the first problem point in the standard derivation of quantitative 
genetics. 
Suppose, however, that we put this problem point aside and adopt the final expressions 
above for the variance between twin pairs.  The intraclass correlations for MZ and DZ twins are 
given by: 
 
IMZT = (YS +L) / Y    (20) 
IDZT = (g YS +L) / Y    (21) 
 





by equations 15 and 16 if g is seen as a synonym for g and YS for V+. The second problem point 
is that g or g is not necessarily 1/2. And the third is that YS is V+, not V; the standard derivation 
has not separated V from VL. As explained at the end of the previous section, the location-
specific variety-location-interaction variance is unavoidably bound together with the between-
variety variance in the single-locus case; this combination is preserved through the subsequent 
steps of the derivation and thus into equations 20 and 21.  
The three problem points can be removed by three steps: decoupling the estimation of 
quantities from any theory about summation of contributions at a single genetic locus; an 
empirical estimation of g or g in place of the use of heuristic values based on the proportion of 
shared genes; and the inclusion of a separate term for VL followed by the collection of the 
classes of data needed to estimate V and VL separately. As indicated in Appendix 1, the 
difference this makes to empirical estimates depends on the values of V, VL, L, E, and g, but 
may be substantial. To highlight the importance of overcoming the problem points, Taylor 
(2007) shows that an adjustment—albeit a simple one—that allows for a nonzero VL results in 
most human heritability estimates falling to values below the fractions for variance between-
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